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IN PARI DELICTO DECONSTRUCTED:
DISMANTLING THE DOCTRINE THAT
PROTECTS THE BUSINESS ENTITY’S
LAWYER FROM MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
PAULA SCHAEFER†
“Fraud on behalf of a corporation is not the same thing as fraud
against it.”1
“If a lawyer for an organization knows that an
[agent] . . . intends to act . . . [in] violation of law that
reasonably might be imputed to the organization . . . then the
lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best
interest of the organization.”2

INTRODUCTION
The in pari delicto doctrine provides that a plaintiff who
participated equally with a defendant in wrongdoing cannot
pursue a claim against the defendant.3 In pari delicto is a
shortened version of the phrase in pari delicto potior est conditio
defendantis, which means “[i]n a case of equal or mutual
fault . . . the position of the [defending] party . . . is the better

†
Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. Thanks to
Zachary Arnold and Grant Ward for their research assistance.
1
Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982).
2
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2015).
3
Feld & Sons, Inc. v. Pechner, Dorfman, Wolfee, Rounick, & Cabot, 458 A.2d
545, 548–49 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (explaining that the in pari delicto doctrine is an
application of the principle that “no court will lend its aid to a man who grounds his
action upon an immoral or illegal act” and noting that the doctrine was first applied
in a 1760 case by Lord Mansfield).
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one.”4 Courts often describe dual policies underlying the in pari
delicto defense: deterrence of illegal conduct and protection of the
sanctity of the courts.5
Lawyers invoke in pari delicto when sued for malpractice for
failing to protect a client from legal liability.6 A common scenario
involves a lawyer advising a client to lie under oath; the client
follows the advice and suffers damage as a result.7 When the
client sues the lawyer for legal malpractice based on the lawyer’s
negligent advice, the lawyer can have the case dismissed based
on in pari delicto.8 Courts reason that the client understood that
it was wrong to lie under oath and that both client and lawyer
are equally at fault for the client’s resulting damages, justifying
dismissal on the basis of in pari delicto.9

4

Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985)
(alteration in original) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979)).
5
Bank of the United States v. Owens, 27 U.S. 527, 538 (1829) (“[N]o court of
justice can in its nature be made the handmaid of iniquity.”); Claybrook v. Broad &
Cassel, P.A. (In re Scott Acquisition Corp.), 364 B.R. 562, 566 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007)
(describing the equitable doctrine’s purposes of preventing “culpable parties from
benefitting from their wrongdoings” and ensuring that courts do not mediate
disputes among wrongdoers).
6
The claim may be framed as one for legal malpractice—that is, professional
negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, or breach of contract. All three claims are often
asserted by a plaintiff and treated by courts as essentially stating the same cause of
action. See, e.g., Wechsler v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent & Sheinfeld, L.L.P., 212
B.R. 34, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The Trustee’s three causes of action—legal malpractice,
breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty—essentially amount to a single claim
for the provision of deficient legal services.”); Kirschner v. K&L Gates LLP, 46 A.3d
737, 748, 755, 758 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (trustee alleged legal
malpractice/professional negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty
based on law firm’s failure to detect and report fraud of company CEO). The term
“malpractice” as used in this Article is meant to encompass all such claims.
7
See, e.g., Grosso v. Biaggi, No. 12 Civ. 6118(JMF), 2013 WL 3743482, at *1–3
(S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2013) (in legal malpractice action, former client alleges that she
committed perjury in dental malpractice case at direction of lawyer, resulting in a
much smaller verdict than if she had not lied); Evans v. Cameron, 360 N.W.2d 25, 27
(Wis. 1985) (client alleges she lied in a bankruptcy proceeding at direction of her
attorney, resulting in her investigation and possible prosecution for perjury).
8
Grosso, 2013 WL 3743482, at *3 (ruling that where plaintiff bases her legal
malpractice claim on her own perjury, plaintiff is in pari delicto with her attorney
and the malpractice claim is barred as a matter of law); Evans, 360 N.W.2d at 29
(holding that the client’s “deliberate act of lying under oath” places her in pari
delicto with counsel, thus barring her claim against him).
9
Pantely v. Garris, Garris & Garris, P.C., 447 N.W.2d 864, 868 (Mich. Ct. App.
1989) (“We can readily envision legal matters so complex . . . that a client could
follow an attorney’s advice, do wrong and still maintain suit on the basis of not being
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While this example involves a client who is an individual,10
the in pari delicto defense also can be invoked when the client is
a business that—through its agents—engaged in fraudulent or
criminal conduct that ultimately damaged the company.11 In this
context, the legal malpractice case is filed against a business
entity’s attorney who failed to advise against the conduct, failed
to inform other agents within the organization about the
misconduct so that they could intervene, or participated in the
misconduct.12 Often, the business has filed for bankruptcy and
the trustee is bringing the malpractice claim against the
company’s former lawyers.13 In other cases, suit is filed by the
company itself, an assignee of the company’s rights, a courtappointed receiver, or its shareholders as a derivative suit.14

equally at fault. But perjury is not complex; and telling the truth poses no
dilemma.”).
10
See cases cited supra note 7.
11
See Henry S. Bryans, Claims Against Lawyers by Bankruptcy Trustees—A
First Course on the In Pari Delicto Defense, 66 BUS. LAW. 587, 587 (2011) (“A cursory
examination of reported decisions in the last seven years reflects over forty claims
brought by bankruptcy trustees against debtors’ pre-petition lawyers.”).
12
See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 946 (N.Y. 2010) (including
a lawyer allegedly participating in client’s agents’ fraudulent scheme). Similarly, an
auditor malpractice case may be brought based on an auditor’s failure to detect
fraud and report it to appropriate company agents so that the company could have
avoided injury. See, e.g., Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 451 (7th
Cir. 1982) (considering liability of independent auditors for failing to detect or report
fraud by company management).
13
See, e.g., Claybrook v. Broad & Cassel, P.A. (In re Scott Acquisition Corp.),
364 B.R. 562 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (explaining that a chapter 7 trustee of the estates
of Scott Acquisition Corporation and Scotty’s Inc. filed claims against attorneys for
legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty); Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 946
(bringing a suit by litigation trustee charged with pursuing causes of action
possessed by company prior to its bankruptcy). The plaintiff stands in the shoes of
the company and not its creditors, making the malpractice claim appropriate but
also making the plaintiff subject to defenses that could have been asserted against
the company. Grubin v. Rattet (In re Food Mgmt. Grp., LLC), 380 B.R. 677, 693
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that a trustee “may only assert claims held by the
bankrupt corporation.”).
14
Though some of the following cases were not legal malpractice claims, all are
representative of the entities that could file a legal malpractice claim in this context.
Cobalt Multifamily Inv’rs I, LLC v. Shapiro, 857 F. Supp. 2d 419, 423 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (court-appointed receiver filed suit on behalf of the company against three sets
of attorneys and their firms who represented company prior to receivership);
Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 998 A.2d 280, 280–82
(Del. 2010) (bringing a derivative suit by the shareholders of AIG, Inc. against
insiders and the company’s accountants for professional negligence); Chaikovska v.
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Courts have applied in pari delicto to dismiss these claims
against the company’s lawyers. The plaintiffs in these cases
stand in the shoes of the wrongdoing company and cannot escape
There is indeed “company
the company’s misconduct.15
misconduct” because, applying basic agency principles,
management’s knowledge or misconduct must be imputed to the
company.16 While there is an exception to imputation when the
agents acted adverse to the company’s interests, that exception is
a narrow one inapplicable when agents engaged in misconduct
for the company’s benefit.17 Courts reason that applying in pari
delicto in such cases deters illegal conduct18 and allows courts to
avoid being parties to the misconduct.19
This Article deconstructs these principles that seemingly
favor the in pari delicto doctrine barring claims against an
organization’s lawyer. In examining in pari delicto in these
cases, it becomes apparent that the doctrine is inconsistent with
an attorney’s fiduciary duty to organizational clients. By barring
or substantially limiting claims against business lawyers in this
context, in pari delicto has effectively immunized lawyers from
liability when they fail to perform one of their most important
functions: acting competently to protect their organizational
clients from legal liability.20 This Article explains how two bodies
of law—in pari delicto and attorney fiduciary duty—should be
reconciled to better protect the interests of organizational clients
and to give attorneys incentives to competently represent their
organizational clients.

Ernst & Young, LLP, 913 N.Y.S.2d 449, 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (filing accounting
malpractice claim by the majority shareholder and corporation’s assignee).
15
See infra Section II.A.
16
See infra Section II.A.
17
See infra Section II.B.
18
See infra Section II.E.
19
See infra Section II.D.
20
George C. Harris, Taking the Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liability for
Failure To Prevent Harm to Organizational Clients Through Disclosure of
Constituent Wrongdoing, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 597, 656–57 (1998) (“The
protection of the [organizational] client from the consequences of fraud or illegal
conduct within the scope of the lawyer’s engagement is or ought to be central to the
organizational lawyer’s enterprise. When the lawyer is actually aware of such
danger to the client’s interests it does not seem unfair to hold her responsible for the
consequences of failing to take reasonable steps to protect the client.”).
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Following this introduction, Part I discusses a representative
case in this area.21 The court’s decision highlights the typical
reasoning for barring a malpractice claim against a lawyer even
when the lawyer facilitated agent misconduct that severely
damaged an entity client. Then, Part II considers each of the
principles underlying the in pari delicto defense in organizational
client legal malpractice cases. Each principle is juxtaposed with
attorney fiduciary duty law. Part III considers some variations
on the in pari delicto doctrine and whether these variations are
more compatible with an organization’s attorney’s fiduciary duty.
Having determined that attorney fiduciary duty is at odds
with in pari delicto in the organizational client context, Part IV
explores why the doctrines should be aligned and determines how
best to accomplish that reconciliation. This Part considers when
imputation may still be appropriate and discusses the safeguards
that could prevent organizational clients from shifting all of the
costs of agent misconduct to outside counsel. Finally, the Article
concludes with thoughts about the benefits for businesses and
the legal profession when lawyers face liability for failing to
protect their organizational clients from liability.
A REPRESENTATIVE CASE: LAWYER MALPRACTICE IMMUNITY
THROUGH IN PARI DELICTO

I.

“A criminal who is injured committing a crime cannot sue the
police officer or security guard who failed to stop him; the
arsonist who is singed cannot sue the fire department.”22

Attorney Joseph Collins represented Refco and its related
companies (referred to collectively as “Refco”) in a number of
business matters.23 Beginning in 1998, Collins helped Refco
21

The case is governed by New York law, which is significant because New York
is noted for its protection of professionals through its strong in pari delicto doctrine.
See, e.g., Gregory W. Fox, Limits of Expansive Protection of New York’s In Pari
Delicto Defense, 33 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20 (2014) (“Simply put, New York’s version
of the in pari delicto defense is among the most protective to professionals in the
nation.”).
22
Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 950 (N.Y. 2010).
23
Collins, and other attorneys at his firm Mayer, Brown, Rowe, & Maw, LLP
(“Mayer Brown”), represented Refco Group Ltd., LLC, its indirect subsidiary Refco
Capital Markets. Ltd., and a company that was created through an initial public
offering, Refco, Inc. Kirschner v. Grant Thornton LLP, No. 07 Civ. 11604(GEL), 2009
WL 1286326, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2009). All of the Refco entities are referred to
collectively in the courts’ decisions as “Refco.” KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d at 945 n.1.
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executives structure seventeen “round-trip” loan transactions
that had the sole purpose of temporarily removing hundreds of
millions of dollars in uncollectable intercompany debt from
Refco’s books.24 As a result, the company was able to attract
investors for a 2004 leveraged buyout and for a 2005 initial
public offering of its stock.25
After the IPO, the hidden
uncollectable debt was revealed, the stock price fell, and the
company was forced to file for bankruptcy.26 A “flood of civil
litigation” followed.27
Collins and a number of Refco executives were convicted and
sentenced for the roles they played in the massive fraud.28 As the
criminal cases proceeded, so did the bankruptcy case. The
bankruptcy plan established the Refco Litigation Trust to pursue
causes of actions possessed by Refco prior to bankruptcy.29 Mark
Kirschner, as trustee of the Refco Litigation Trust, filed a legal
malpractice case against Collins’ law firm, Mayer Brown,
alleging claims of malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding
and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting
fraud.30 Kirschner filed related claims of fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, and malpractice against Refco insiders, the
investment banks that served as underwriters for the leveraged

24

In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d 304, 306–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2009);
KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d at 945–46 n.2.
25
KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d at 945.
26
Id. at 945–46.
27
Id. at 945 n.2 (citing In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 611, 618
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); Thomas H. Lee Equity Fund V, L.P. v. Grant Thornton LLP, 586 F.
Supp. 2d 119, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Refco Capital Mkts., Ltd. Brokerage
Customer Sec. Litig., No. 06 Civ. 643(GEL), 2007 WL 2694469, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
13, 2007)).
28
Collins was sentenced to one year and one day for his conviction for
“conspiracy, securities fraud, [submitting] false filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and wire fraud.” United States v. Collins, 581 F. App’x 59, 59
(2d Cir. 2014). In the criminal case against Collins, the district court gave the jury
an instruction on “conscious avoidance,” allowing the jury to find the element of
knowledge by determining that Collins’s participation in the crime was “so
overwhelmingly suspicious that the defendant’s failure to question the suspicious
circumstances establishes the defendant’s purposeful contrivance to avoid guilty
knowledge.” Id. at 60 (emphasis omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction, finding there was sufficient evidence to
support the conscious avoidance charge. Id. at 61.
29
KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d at 946.
30
Complaint at 107–12, Kirschner v. Grant Thornton LLP, (No. 07-cv-05306)
(Cook Cnty Ct. filed Sept. 19, 2007).
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buyout and the initial public offering, third parties that
participated in the loans, and accounting firms employed by
Refco.31 The cases, which were originally filed in Illinois and
Massachusetts state court, were removed to federal court and
transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York.32
The law firm, accounting firms, investment banks, and third
party participants in the loans filed motions to dismiss, asserting
that the litigation trustee lacked standing to bring the claims
under the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s
Wagoner doctrine.33 The Wagoner doctrine provides that a
bankruptcy trustee lacks standing to recover from third parties
“alleged to have joined with the debtor corporation in defrauding
Because the Wagoner doctrine incorporates
creditors.”34
applicable state substantive law concerning in pari delicto,35 the
district court considered New York law in ruling that the case
should be dismissed.36
On appeal, the Second Circuit noted that the parties were in
sharp dispute concerning the district court’s interpretation of
New York law on the adverse-interest exception to the in pari
delicto doctrine.37 On that basis, the Second Circuit certified
questions on that issue to the New York Court of Appeals.38
31

KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d at 946.
Id.
33
Id. at 946 (citing Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114,
118 (2d Cir. 1991)).
34
Id.
35
Id. at 946 n.3 (explaining that while the District Court characterized the
Wagoner rule as “an application of the substantive law of New York,” the Wagoner
rule “is not part of New York law except as it reflects the in pari delicto principle”);
see also Wechsler v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent & Sheinfeld, L.L.P., 212 B.R. 34, 44
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (explaining that the Wagoner rule refers to “dismissal of a bankrupt
company’s damage claims where the company’s sole shareholder participated in the
fraudulent scheme,” and describing the rule as “application of the in pari delicto
doctrine or certainly . . . closely akin to it”). The dissent in the Kirschner case asserts
that the Wagoner decision and its progeny have “incorrectly characterize[d] New
York’s version of in pari delicto as a limitation on standing” and explains that under
New York law, in pari delicto is an affirmative defense. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d at
959–60 (Ciparik, J., dissenting).
36
KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d at 947–48 (majority opinion).
37
Id. at 948.
38
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing the Second Circuit asking
the New York Court of Appeals to focus its attention on two of eight certified
questions: “whether the adverse-interest exception is satisfied by showing that the
32
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In its decision in the matter, the New York Court of Appeals
began by explaining the basis for the in pari delicto doctrine is
the principle that “courts will not intercede to resolve a dispute
between two wrongdoers.”39 The court noted that the justice of
the doctrine is apparent in cases where willful wrongdoer sues a
party alleged to be negligent, but that the doctrine also applies
when both parties engaged in willful misconduct.40
In cases involving an organizational client, imputation is
essential to in pari delicto’s application. The New York Court of
Appeals explained that both the acts of an organization’s agents
and the knowledge they acquire “are presumptively imputed to
their principals.”41 The court reasoned that principals select
their agents, can only act through their agents, and should bear
the risks of even the unauthorized acts of their agents.42
The court explained that the only time it is inappropriate to
presume communication of knowledge from agent to principal is
when the principal is the agent’s intended victim.43 This is the
adverse-interest exception to imputation: when the agent has
“totally abandoned the principal’s interest,” then his knowledge
is not imputed to the principal.44 If there is a benefit to both
agent and principal, the adverse-interest exception does not
apply.45 It is only when the corporation enjoys no benefit
whatsoever—such as theft by the agent from the corporation—
that the exception applies, which means no imputation and the
The court rejected the
possibility of a malpractice suit.46
suggestion that the company’s ultimate bankruptcy is harm

insiders intended to benefit themselves by their misconduct; and whether the
exception is available only where the insiders’ misconduct has harmed the
corporation”); see also Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 590 F.3d 186, 194–95 (2d Cir. 2009)
(describing the overarching question as whether the complaint’s allegations “satisfy
the ‘adverse[-]interest’ exception” to the rule of imputing insider misconduct to the
corporation, and then describing seven subsidiary questions).
39
KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d at 950.
40
Id.; see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
41
KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d at 950.
42
Id. at 950–51.
43
Id. at 951.
44
Id. at 952.
45
Id.
46
Id. The court further clarifies that fraud committed against the corporation
would invoke the exception while fraud on its behalf does not. Id.
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enough, reasoning that when fraud ultimately causes
bankruptcy, it does not follow that the company’s agents totally
abandoned the company.47
The New York Court of Appeals then considered and rejected
arguments for expanding the adverse-interest exception in order
to make outside professionals responsible for professional
negligence to organizational clients.48 First, the court considered
whether the adverse-interest exception’s availability should
hinge on subjective intent, namely whether the insiders intended
to benefit themselves at the company’s expense, and that they
either received such a benefit and/or that the company suffered
long-term harm.49 The court rejected this formulation, stating
that the exception would encompass every corporate fraud
because fraudsters are not motivated by charitable impulses and
the company “is always likely to suffer long-term harm once the
fraud becomes known.”50
Second, the court considered New Jersey’s approach of
barring imputation of agent misconduct to the corporation in
cases of professional negligence to the extent the recipient of
recovery is an innocent shareholder51 and Pennsylvania’s
approach of prohibiting imputation of agent misconduct in cases
where the outside professional “had not proceeded in material
good faith,” such as by colluding with company agents to defraud
the company.52 The court understood the goal of such approaches
as deterring third party professional misconduct and
compensating innocent owners of these companies.53
The New York Court of Appeals was not persuaded, and
explained that it does not understand why the “innocent
stakeholders of corporate fraudsters [should] trump those of
innocent stakeholders of the outside professionals who are the
defendants in these cases.”54 The court saw the equities lying
47

Id. at 953.
Id. at 954.
49
Id. at 954–55 (citing In re CBI Holding Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 432, 438 (2d Cir.
2008)).
50
Id. at 955.
51
Id. (citing NCP Litig. Tr. v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 890 (N.J. 2006)).
52
Id. at 956 (citing Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health
Educ. & Research Found. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 989 A.2d 313, 335–36
(Pa. 2010)).
53
Id. at 957–58.
54
Id. at 958.
48
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with the outside professionals, and explained “the corporation’s
agents would almost invariably play the dominant role in the
fraud and therefore would be more culpable than the outside
professional’s agents who allegedly aided and abetted the
insiders or did not detect the fraud at all or soon enough.”55 The
court asserted that there are already adequate disincentives to
outside professionals participating in corporate client fraud
without expanding the adverse-interest exception, noting
settlements by underwriters and accounting firms in other
cases.56 The court ultimately concluded that the “speculative
public policy benefits” of an expanded adverse-interest exception
did not outweigh the policies underlying current in pari delicto
law.57
II. DECONSTRUCTING THE IN PARI DELICTO DEFENSE IN A
MALPRACTICE CASE AGAINST THE BUSINESS ENTITY’S LAWYER
This Part considers the various principles underlying
application of the in pari delicto defense when a lawyer is sued
for malpractice for failing to protect an entity client from legal
liability at the hands of insiders. Each principle is juxtaposed
with attorney fiduciary duties to organizational clients. In every
case, there is conflict. The rules that courts rely upon in
applying in pari delicto are counter to a lawyer’s legal duties to
organizational clients. Further, the policies that courts claim are
furthered by applying in pari delicto are not advanced in this
context of organizational clients or successors in interest suing
counsel for professional negligence.
Some of the cases cited in this and the following Part are
auditor malpractice cases. It is useful to consider auditor
malpractice cases because auditors and lawyers are both:
(1) outside agents of the organizational client, and (2) sued for
failing to take action that would have protected the entity from
liabity.58 Even when a jurisdiction has not considered in pari

55
56
57
58

Id.
Id. at 958–59.
Id. at 959.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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delicto in the context of business lawyer liability, it is highly
likely that the auditor liability analysis would be applied in a
lawyer liability case.59
A.

Courts Impute an Agent’s Knowledge or Misconduct to the
Entity Client

Imputing the agent’s knowledge or conduct60 to the company
is a necessary step in the in pari delicto analysis in these
malpractice cases.61 Without imputation, the company cannot be
treated as equally responsible for the misconduct and barred
from pursuing its claim.62
Imputation is a step that is easily satisfied, because courts
generally presume imputation is appropriate in the in pari
delicto context.63 Some courts describe imputation in terms of
The
imputing the agent’s knowledge to the principal.64
Restatement (Third) of Agency section 5.03 provides that “notice
of a fact that an agent knows” is imputed to the principal when
59

The reasons that emerge for questioning the appropriateness of in pari delicto
defense in the lawyer malpractice context may also provide reason to question the
defense in the auditor malpractice context. However, because this Article does not
analyze the auditor’s duties to the business client, it does not take a position on
whether and how the in pari delicto defense should be reconceptualized in the
auditor malpractice context.
60
This Article and many cases generally refer to both knowledge and conduct
being imputed to the organizational client. But see Deborah A. DeMott, Further
Perspectives on Corporate Wrongdoing, In Pari Delicto, and Auditor Malpractice, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 339, 341–342 (2012) (describing the distinction between
attributing conduct and imputing knowledge to a principal).
61
See, e.g., Casey v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401, 404 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2005)Joint Equity Comm. v. Genovese, No. .
62
Id. at 404–05.
63
See, e.g., Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton
LLP, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 31, 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that the question of
imputation “is not complicated” because there is settled law in California that an
officer’s knowledge within the scope of his duties is imputed to the corporation).
64
See, e.g., N.K.S. Distrib., Inc. v. Wheeler, Wolfenden & Dwares, P.A., No.
N11C-11-146-JRJ, 2014 WL 4793438, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2014)
(explaining that for purposes of applying in pari delicto, Delaware agency law
requires court to impute agent knowledge to the principal unless agent’s interests
were adverse); NCP Litig. Tr. v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 879 (N.J. 2006)
(asserting that pursuant to the common law of agency, the principal is “deemed to
know facts that are known to its agent”); Chaikovska v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 913
N.Y.S.2d 449, 452 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (asserting that, in discussing the application
of the in pari delicto doctrine, “knowledge” of an agent acting within the scope of
agency is imputed to the principal and the principal is bound by that knowledge
even if it was never communicated).
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the fact is material to the agent’s duties.65 Other courts describe
imputation in terms of conduct.66
This is akin to the
Restatement (Third) of Agency’s discussion of vicarious liability.67
Regardless of whether a court in these cases is imputing
knowledge or conduct, imputation is based entirely upon basic
principles of agency law.68 The same principles are relied upon in
cases in which a company and a third party are involved in tort,
contract, or other litigation.69 The agent’s actions and knowledge
are attributed to the principal and can result in the principal’s
liability to a third party.70
But reliance on agency principles as a basis for barring the
malpractice claim is not legally sound.71 The law allows a
company to sue its employees without imputation barring the
company’s claims.72 Yet, these same jurisdictions bar comparable
65

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). The provision
notes that imputation does not apply if the agent acts adversely to the principal. Id.
at § 5.04.
66
See, e.g., Tolz v. Proskauer Rose LLP (In re Fuzion Techs. Grp., Inc.), 332 B.R.
225, 230 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005) (“Normally, under agency principles, if the plaintiff
acted wrongfully through an agent in the scope of that agency relationship, then the
wrongdoing of the agent is attributed to the plaintiff.”); Am. Int’l. Grp. v. Greenberg
(AIG I), 965 A.2d 763, 823 (Del. Ch. 2009) (explaining that under New York law the
agent’s knowledge and “the wrongdoing” is imputed to the corporation).
67
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (describing
principal’s vicarious liability to third party harmed by agent’s conduct).
68
Id. at ch. 2, intro. note (“This Chapter states . . . the three distinct bases on
which the common law of agency attributes the legal consequences of one person’s
action to another person. . . . The three distinct bases for attribution are actual
authority, apparent authority, and respondeat superior. . . . The legal consequences
that these doctrines attribute to a principal are not consequences of agency doctrine
itself but of other bodies of law.”).
69
Id. § 6.01 (principal has contractual liability when agent with actual or
apparent authority makes a contract on behalf of a disclosed principal); id. § 7.03
(describing circumstances in which principal has tort liability for agent’s conduct
under principles of actual authority, apparent authority, and respondeat superior).
70
Id. §§ 6.01, 7.03.
71
See Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Whether or not
application of the in pari delicto doctrine should depend on imputation rules
borrowed from agency law is debatable.”); AIG I, 965 A.2d at 828 n.246 (questioning
New York’s reliance on agency principles in the in pari delicto context and
explaining, “[i]t is a policy judgment, not some rote conflation of contextually
different questions of agency, that must determine whether . . . an auditor should
face liability of professional negligence to its client corporation”).
72
See, e.g., Claybrook v. Broad & Cassel, P.A. (In re Scott Acquisition Corp.),
364 B.R. 562, 565 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (referencing the fact that, in dismissing
claims against attorneys who participated with insiders in conduct that damaged the
company, insiders were sued in a separate action and that the court refused to
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claims against attorneys through imputation.73 In other words,
imputation is used inconsistently depending on the identity of
the agent. But there is no substantive difference between
insiders and attorneys: both are agents, owing fiduciary duties to
a principal, who engaged in misconduct alleged to have
proximately caused damages to that principal.74 A cause of
action should be allowed to proceed against both without a bar
via imputation.
Moreover, applying agency principles to bar a malpractice
claim is inconsistent with an attorney’s fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty to the entity client.75 A lawyer advising and assisting

dismiss claims against them); Goldin v. Primavera Familienstiftung, Tag Assocs.,
Ltd. (In re Granite Partners, L.P.), 194 B.R. 318, 332 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“In
pari delicto bars claims against third parties, but does not apply to corporate
insiders or partners. Otherwise, a trustee could never sue the debtor’s insiders on
account of their own wrongdoing.”); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., v. Greenberg (AIG II), 976
A.2d 872, 876 (Del. Ch. 2009) (explaining that AIG’s suits were allowed to proceed
against the company’s own officers and employees without consideration of in pari
delicto because “the doctrine does not have force in a suit by a corporation against its
own officers or employees”); Trenwick Am. Litig. Tr. v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., No.
1571-N, 2006 WL 4782378, at *33 n.132 (Del. Ch. Aug. 10, 2006) (refusing to apply
in pari delicto based on imputation from insiders); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
73
See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 945 (N.Y. 2010).
74
The Delaware Court of Chancery has explained that it is sound for the in pari
delicto doctrine to be put aside so that a company—via a derivative suit—can pursue
a claim against insiders who breached fiduciary duties to the company. AIG II, 976
A.2d at 890 (“If there was illegal conduct, derivative plaintiffs may recover for the
harm that the corporation suffered when those fiduciaries knowingly caused the
corporation to violate positive law.”). The court went on to explain that the same
analysis supports allowing derivative suits against outside corporate agents like
auditors and counsel. Id. at 890 n.49 (“If these professionals fail in their duties as
gatekeepers, there is a strong argument to be made that they ought to be
accountable for their malpractice and not immunized by the very actions that were
not discovered due to their failure to meet expected professional standards.”).
75
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16(2), (3) (AM.
LAW INST. 2000) (stating that a lawyer’s duty of care requires the lawyer to “act with
reasonable competence and diligence” while duty of loyalty requires the lawyer to
comply with obligations concerning confidentiality, avoid conflicts of interest, deal
honestly with the client, and not take advantages from the relationship adverse to
the client); id. § 16 cmt. b (stating that the rationale for § 16 is that the lawyer is a
fiduciary); see also Kirschner v. K&L Gates, LLP, 46 A.3d 737, 757 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2012) (describing attorney’s duty to client as including “both a duty of competent
representation and the highest duty of honesty, fidelity, and confidentiality.”). A
lawyer should face civil liability for violating these duties of care and loyalty if the
violation is the legal cause of injury to the client. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 48, 49.
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an organizational client76 should face liability if he failed to
protect the client from liability arising from agent misconduct
when a reasonably prudent lawyer would have done so.77 While
an attorney usually must accept instructions of the company’s
authorized agents, that obligation changes when agents are
planning to engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct.78 Instead,
a competent, loyal lawyer should inform other authorities within
the company who can take action to protect the company.79 In
76

The lawyer in this context is not a litigator acting as an advocate for the
client in an adversary proceeding. See JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE
PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 192–93 (2006) (contrasting the role and
work of a corporate lawyer with that of a litigator). This lawyer is hired to advise
and assist in a course of future conduct, not to zealously advocate in litigation for the
client’s position concerning past events. Id.
77
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 96(2), cmt. d,
cmt. f, note to cmt. f (citing cases that stand for the proposition that an attorney has
a duty to protect the organizational client against wrongful acts by constituents).
See, e.g., FDIC v. O’Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing
California law for the proposition that it is an attorney’s duty to “protect his client in
every possible way” and that an attorney fulfills this duty by acting with the “skill,
prudence and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly
possess.”), rev’d, 512 U.S. 79 (1994) (reversed on the grounds that the court applied
federal and not state law), remanded to 61 F.3d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1995) (adopting
earlier opinion with the exception of part concerning defenses in which earlier
decision relied upon federal law); see also Harris, supra note 20, at 638 (explaining
that if a lawyer’s loyalty is owed to an organizational client, then the lawyer has a
duty to that client to prevent and/or limit the consequences of constituent fraud or
crime that will harm the organization “through liability to third parties or
otherwise”).
78
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2) (explaining
that if lawyer knows that constituent of an organization intends to act in a way that
violates an obligation to the organization or that will be imputed to the organization
and likely to result in substantial injury to it, then “the lawyer must proceed in what
the lawyer reasonably believes to be the best interests of the organization”); id. § 96
cmt. d (2000) (explaining that an agent’s instruction to the organization’s lawyer to
perform, counsel, or assist in an unlawful act does not bind the lawyer and “does not
remove the lawyer’s duty to protect the best interests of the organizational client”);
see also Harris, supra note 20, at 638 (“If one takes the entity theory seriously, the
lawyer for an organizational client must act . . . in a manner loyal to the interest of
the entity and without regard to the direction of agents of the organization who are
engaged in or complicit in wrongdoing. . . . The organizational constituent engaged
in crime or fraud . . . is in effect disabled . . . from speaking on behalf of the client.”).
79
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(3) (attorney
may seek review by higher authorities in the organization, “including referring the
matter to the highest authority that can act in behalf of the organization.”); see, e.g.,
In re Am. Cont’l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1453 (D.
Ariz. 1992) (“[W]here a law firm believes the management of a corporate client is
committing serious regulatory violations, the firm has an obligation to actively
discuss the violative conduct [and] urge cessation of the activity.”); Wechsler v.
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other words, as a fiduciary, the lawyer has a duty to inform
company decision makers of the material information that
company agents are planning or are engaged in harmful
wrongdoing.80 Further, it is in the organizational client’s interest
for the lawyer to withdraw from the representation rather than
facilitate an agent’s crime or fraud.81
These fiduciary obligations of the organization’s attorney are
embodied in professional conduct rules.82 These rules direct
attorneys that they should not comply with instructions from
company agents who want to engage in conduct that will create
liability for the company.83 Further, the rules guide attorneys in
steps they should take to protect the client from an agent’s
Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent & Sheinfeld, L.L.P., 212 B.R. 34, 38–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(explaining that the plaintiff alleged a breach of the duty to exercise “reasonable
care, skill, prudence and judgment” when lawyers “fail[ed] to advise members of [the
client] of . . . factual information and legal considerations reasonably necessary to
alert [the client] to the nature of its actions”). In addition, an attorney may also have
an obligation of disclosure outside of the organization if doing so will protect the
interests of the organization and is not prohibited by professional conduct rules.
Paula Schaefer, Overcoming Noneconomic Barriers to Loyal Disclosure, 44 AM. BUS.
L.J. 417, 434 (2007) [hereinafter Schaefer, Loyal Disclosure] (asserting that in a
jurisdiction that has adopted a loyal disclosure rule, it would be a violation of a
lawyer’s duties of loyalty and care to not disclose when doing so would protect the
organizational client).
80
William H. Simon, Duties to Organizational Clients, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
489, 501 (2016) (describing a lawyer’s duty to report up-the-ladder as broader than
stated in Rule 1.13 because “under traditional fiduciary principles” a lawyer should
provide the client with the material information needed to make decisions).
81
See, e.g., Am. Cont’l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. at
1453 (explaining that if a lawyer cannot convince management to cease misconduct,
the lawyer must “withdraw from representation where the firm’s legal services may
contribute to the continuation of such conduct.”).
82
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 cmt. b (AM.
LAW INST. 2000) (explaining that professional conduct rules draw from preexisting
legal requirements, including agency law); Paula Schaefer, A Primer on
Professionalism for Doctrinal Professors, 81 TENN. L. REV. 277, 287–88 (2014)
(explaining that some professional conduct rules, including Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.13, are based on lawyers’ fiduciary duties to clients). A
violation of rules such as these—that describe the lawyer’s duty to a client—could be
evidence in a claim for malpractice that the lawyer breached the duty owed to the
client. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., ¶¶ 10–11 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2014).
83
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) cmt. 3 (explaining that
ordinarily a lawyer must accept decisions—even imprudent decisions—of agents for
an organization, but that Rule 1.13(b) “makes clear” that when agents are engaged
in conduct that violates a legal obligation to or on behalf of the organization, the
lawyer must instead proceed in the best interests of the organization).
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planned or ongoing misconduct, including up-the-ladder
reporting84 and loyal disclosure.85 The rules were adopted in the
post-Enron era to address concerns that attorneys were
contributing to the bankruptcies of their corporate clients by not
stopping agent fraud.86
Explanations for why lawyers are required to treat the
organizational client as having an interest in avoiding legal
liability—even when company agents believe illegal conduct will
be profitable for the company—include that a company’s
obligation to act in compliance with law is the trade-off for
limited liability87 and that this conception protects innocent
stakeholders—nonagent owners and creditors of insolvent
businesses.88
84
17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b), (c) (2016) (describing up-the-ladder reporting obligation
when attorney “becomes aware of evidence of a material violation” by the issuer or
an agent of the issuer); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (providing that
when an organization’s attorney knows that a company agent is engaged in conduct
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization that is a violation of a duty
to the organization or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the
organization, then the attorney must proceed in the best interests of the
organization including referring the matter to higher authorities in the
organization).
85
17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(i), (iii); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c);
see generally, Harris, supra note 20, 600–01 (explaining that disclosure of
organizational client agent wrongdoing is “loyal” to the client if it precludes or limits
the entity’s liability).
86
Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle with the
SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1236–39 (2003) (describing post-Enron response of
Congress and the SEC to address attorney obligations in the representation of
corporate clients); Schaefer, Loyal Disclosure, supra note 79, at 424–32 (describing
events leading up to the 2003 adoption of up-the-ladder and loyal disclosure
professional conduct rules by the ABA and SEC following high profile corporate
scandals in 2001).
87
See Harris, supra note 20, at 651 (“The legitimate quid pro quo [for allowing
limited liability organizations] may be that the legal system as a whole, including
the lawyer engaged to represent the interests of the organization, will take that
separate entity seriously.”).
88
A. V. Pritchard, O’Melveny & Meyers v. FDIC: Imputation of Fraud and
Optimal Monitoring, in 4 SUPREME COURT ECONOMIC REVIEW 179, 192–99 (Harold
Demsetz et al. eds., 1995) (asserting that creditors prefer a legal framework that
enlists fiduciary professionals in monitoring company agents for fraud; stating that
while risk is desirable to shareholders “surely shareholders do not want managers
committing fraud on the corporation’s behalf,” but ultimately concluding that with
the boundaries of fraud murky that perhaps shareholders prefer a rule in which
attorneys do not have liability for failing to detect and prevent agent fraud); Harris,
supra note 20, at 639–40 (explaining it has been widely held that agents of an
insolvent corporation owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation’s creditors).
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Imputation in the in pari delicto context, which has the
effect of barring claims against attorneys, is thus incompatible
with the law of organizational attorney fiduciary duty in two key
ways. First, an attorney is not permitted to follow the directions
of an agent who wants to engage in conduct that will create
liability for the company.89 In other words, the law of fiduciary
duty provides that company insiders lack actual and apparent
authority when they ask an attorney to facilitate liabilitycreating conduct.90 It is inconsistent then to attribute the
conduct of these insiders to the company in order to bar the
company’s claim against an attorney who breached his fiduciary
duty by taking direction from those very insiders. Second, the
attorney’s duty includes providing notice or knowledge to higher
authorities within the company.91
Imputing an agent’s
knowledge to the company to defeat a claim against an attorney
who was required but failed to provide notice of that same
information to the company is illogical.92
Another problem with imputation in this context is the issue
of fault. For in pari delicto to apply, the plaintiff should be “an
active, voluntary participant in the unlawful activity that is the

89

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2) (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (stating that there is an obligation to act in the best interest of the client
when an agent “intends to act in a way that violates a legal obligation to the
organization . . . or that reasonably can be foreseen to be imputable to the
organization and likely to result in substantial injury to it”); MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (requiring attorneys to protect the
organization when an agent is engaged in conduct “that is a violation of a legal
obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be
imputed to the organization”).
90
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (serving as
actual authority); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (serving as apparent
authority). See also Simon, supra note 80, at 490–491 (client managers who ask
lawyers to engage in conduct intended to deceive should not be understood to speak
for the client).
91
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(3); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b).
92
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(3); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b); see also Kevin H. Michels, The Corporate
Attorney as “Internal” Gatekeeper and the In Pari Delicto Defense: A Proposed New
Standard, 4 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 318, 355 (2014) (asserting that the
rationale for imputing knowledge of agent to principal breaks down in this context
because the lawyer is “an additional agent of the corporation with reporting duties of
her own.”).
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subject of the suit.”93 Further, a plaintiff’s equal or even greater
fault is traditionally a component of application of the in pari
delicto doctrine.94 In many cases involving clients that are
individuals instead of organizational clients, equal fault of
attorney and client is a point of contention.95 The client typically
argues that he or she did not know the law and was following the
attorney’s advice, thus the attorney has greater fault.96 Courts’
analysis often centers around whether the client knew that her
conduct violated the law.97 This kind of thoughtful analysis is
typically absent in the malpractice cases involving attorneys and
organizational clients.98 Courts act as if imputation answers the
question of equal fault and no further analysis is needed.99

93

Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 636 (1988); see also BrandAid Mktg. Corp. v.
Biss, 462 F.3d 216, 218 (2d Cir. 2006).
94
Pinter, 486 U.S. at 632 (citation omitted) (explaining the defense is “limited to
situations where the plaintiff bore ‘at least substantially equal responsibility for the
injury,’ and where the parties’ culpability arose out of the same illegal act”).
95
See, e.g., Helbling v. Josselson (In re Almasri), 378 B.R. 550, 556 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 2007) (denying dismissal of malpractice claim because court could not
determine on the record whether client and attorney were at equal fault where
client’s discharge was revoked because attorney did not list bank account and
business in bankruptcy petition and schedules); Choquette v. Isacoff, 836 N.E.2d
329, 334 (Mass. App. 2005) (affirming decision that in pari delicto barred client’s
malpractice claim against attorney upon determining client and lawyer were equally
at fault in client’s decision to commit perjury); McKinley v. Weidner, 698 P.2d 983,
986 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that trial court did not have sufficient facts before it
to dismiss case on basis of in pari delicto in that attorney, a “presumed expert in the
law” may have greater fault than plaintiff for advice that plaintiff tender check with
intent to dishonor it as part of a plan to recover a boat from a third party).
96
Choquette, 836 N.E.2d at 334 (involving a client that asserted that given the
“complexity of bankruptcy law” he relied upon attorney’s advice to lie under oath).
97
Id. (“It is clear from the record that Choquette knew he was not making full
disclosure and that he continued to resist making full disclosure.”).
98
For example, in AIG I, the court explained that “if imputation applies, AIG is
deemed to have participated in its directors’, officers’, and employees’ fraudulent
schemes and AIG is deemed to have been as or more guilty of wrongdoing than its
auditor, PWC, AIG is barred from recovering against PWC.” 965 A.2d 723, 824 (Del.
Ch. 2009). Ultimately, the AIG I court dismissed the case against the auditor with
no analysis of relative fault. The court explained this was appropriate under New
York law because the complaint contained an allegation that company insiders acted
with scienter. Thus, the company and the auditor were deemed to be at least equally
at fault and in pari delicto required the complaint be dismissed. Id. at 827 n.245.
99
See id.
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Even if the knowledge or conduct of the agent is imputed to
the principal/client, it does not follow that attorney and client are
equally at fault.100 First, it is the lawyer’s role to competently
advise about the law.101 Clients—and their agents—rely on
attorneys to provide this advice.102 When a lawyer does not say
“this is fraud” or “this will result in liability for the company,” the
agent may not understand the implications of the conduct.103 The
agent may understand that the conduct is unethical, but may
think that it is nonetheless technically legal—in part because of
the attorney’s advice or lack thereof.104

100

See generally, Christine M. Shepard, Corporate Wrongdoing and the In Pari
Delicto Defense in Auditor Malpractice Cases: A New Approach, 69 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 275, 324–33 (2012) (asserting that imputation should not be the basis of a
determination of corporate client fault for purposes of in pari delicto and proposing a
framework for determining fault in the context of auditor malpractice cases).
101
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94(1) (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (citing §§ 52, 55, 56) (stating that a lawyer is liable to a client if the
lawyer counsels or assists a client to engage in conduct that violates the rights of a
third person to the extent that doing so violates the lawyer’s duty of care or other
duty to the client under applicable law); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (obligating a lawyer to exercise “independent
professional judgment and render candid advice”).
102
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94(1); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1; see also Harris, supra note 20, at 642 (“A
determination that constituents of the organization are engaged on behalf of the
organization in crime or fraud with significant likely adverse consequences for the
organization is . . . peculiarly within the province of the lawyer’s expertise and duty
to the client.”).
103
See, e.g., Cobalt Multifamily Inv’rs I, LLC v. Shapiro, 857 F. Supp. 2d 419,
424–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (involving three law firms having assisted company’s agents
in defrauding investors by, among other things, creating a trust that was used to
conceal misappropriated funds, approving private placement memoranda that
contained material misrepresentations, and failing to perform due diligence that
would have revealed the company was being operated as a Ponzi scheme); see also
Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Of the Conditional Fee as a Response to Lawyers,
Bankers and Loopholes, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 42, 46–47 (2011–2012) (explaining the
circumstances in which lawyers providing advice and assistance in transactional
matters engage in “creative envelope–pushing” that may ultimately result in
liability for clients).
104
Another explanation for treating the lawyer as having greater fault when the
lawyer advises or facilitates wrongful conduct is that lawyers have a greater
obligation than clients to ensure the integrity of the administration of justice.
Vincent R. Johnson, The Unlawful Conduct Defense in Legal Malpractice, 77 UMKC
L. REV. 43, 73 n.185 (2008) [hereinafter Johnson, Unlawful Conduct] (asserting that
attorney is arguably at greater fault than client when lawyer advises client to lie to
the court). Taking this argument a step further, lawyers have a greater obligation
than clients to ensure compliance with law.

1022

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1003

Further, even if the lawyer properly advised the agent of the
prospect of liability and the agent still insisted upon the
misconduct, it is also the lawyer’s obligation to provide
information to other individuals in the company so that they can
stop the company from engaging in the misconduct.105 The fact
that one agent insisted on misconduct is not equivalent to a case
in which the company’s highest authority was informed by
counsel that the company could face liability and the company
chose to engage in the misconduct anyway.106
In determining if the company is at equal or greater fault
than its lawyer, insiders’ understanding of the illegality and
knowledge by the highest authority in the company should have
a bearing on the issue. These issues are ignored, though, when a
court dismisses or enters summary judgment on a legal
malpractice claim based entirely on the imputation
presumption.107
B.

The Adverse-Interest Exception Does Not Apply When the
Business Entity Was the “Beneficiary” of the Agent
Misconduct

When the adverse-interest exception to imputation applies,
the plaintiff is allowed to pursue its legal malpractice action
because the agent’s conduct is not imputed to the principal.108
The narrow interpretation placed on the exception in many
jurisdictions means that the business entity’s attorney has little
to fear.109 In pari delicto will protect against liability.110
105

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(3); see also
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b).
106
See, e.g., Cobalt, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 424–25 (involving a complaint that
alleged that law firm knew that company’s agent was misusing company funds but
did not inform the company or its investors of that fact).
107
MF Glob. Holdings Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 57 F. Supp. 3d 206,
206–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (explaining that the in pari delicto doctrine can be applied at
the motion to dismiss stage when its application is “plain on the face of the
pleadings”).
108
Center v. Hampton Affiliates, Inc., 488 N.E.2d 828, 830 (N.Y. 1985) (“To
come within the [adverse-interest] exception, the agent must have totally abandoned
his principal’s interests and be acting entirely for his own or another’s purposes.”).
109
Id.; see also Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 952 (N.Y. 2010)
(asserting that the adverse-interest exception “reserves this most narrow of
exceptions for those cases—outright theft or looting or embezzlement—where the
insider’s misconduct benefits only himself or a third party; i.e., where the fraud is
committed against a corporation rather than on its behalf”). For a discussion of the
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The adverse-interest exception provides that if the
company’s agent was acting adversely to the principal’s interest,
the agent’s knowledge or conduct should not be imputed to the
company for purposes of in pari delicto.111 “Adverse” has been
interpreted narrowly to mean acting in a manner that solely
benefits the agent, such as when the agent is stealing from the
company.112 Accordingly, if a manager stole money from the
company, the company would not be prohibited from suing an
attorney whose negligence facilitated the theft.113 The reasoning
behind the exception is that an agent acting adverse to the
principal would not have provided notice of the conduct to the
principal, so imputation of knowledge is not appropriate.114
The adverse-interest analysis of many courts turns largely
on whether the corporation received any benefit, however slight
or short lived, from the agent’s misconduct.115 Any benefit to the

broader reading some jurisdictions have given the adverse-interest exception, see
infra text accompanying notes 195–197.
110
See, e.g., Hill v. Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, LLP (In re ms55, Inc.), 338 B.R.
883, 897–99 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006) (granting summary judgment in favor of law
firm, finding that undisputed facts reflected “valid business purposes” were at least
one motivation for the allegedly fraudulent transactions facilitated by law firm).
111
Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 952 (explaining that the law presumes the agent
will communicate all information to the principal except under the narrow
circumstances of the adverse-interest exception where the principal is the agent’s
victim).
112
Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2006) (explaining that the
adverse-interest exception applies when the agent acts to serve himself or a third
party, with “the classic example being looting”); Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 952
(describing the narrow exception as encompassing theft, looting, or embezzlement).
113
Wechsler v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent & Sheinfeld, L.L.P., 212 B.R. 34, 45
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (asserting that the adverse-interest exception may be appropriate
because the Trustee alleged that the law firm defendant failed to stop an agent’s
looting of the client, “which would appear to satisfy the requirement of a total
abandonment of [the client’s] interests”).
114
Center v. Hampton Affiliates, Inc., 488 N.E.2d 828, 829–30 (N.Y. 1985)
(explaining that “the presumption that knowledge held by the agent was disclosed to
the principal fails because he cannot be presumed to have disclosed that which
would expose and defeat his fraudulent purpose”).
115
Oppenheimer-Palmieri Fund, L.P. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 802 F. Supp.
804, 817 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating adverse interest does not apply “when the agent
acts both for himself and the principal, though his primary interest is inimical to the
principal”); Stewart v. Wilmington Tr. SP Servs., Inc., 112 A.3d 271, 303 (Del. Ch.
2015) (stating adverse-interest exception is inapplicable even when the “benefit” to
the plaintiff is “outweighed by the long-term damage that is done when the agent’s
mischief comes to light”).
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company results in a finding that the exception does not apply.116
For example, while conduct amounting to agent theft from the
company is the one scenario in which the adverse-interest
exception usually applies,117 even in this context, courts can deny
the exception by finding that some benefit accrued to the
company. In In re Scott Acquisition Corp., company agents
received help from company lawyers in structuring sales of
company assets to the agents at amounts substantially below
their fair value, followed by the company leasing the assets back
from the agents.118 Company lawyers also acted on both sides of
loan transactions between the company and insiders.119
When the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee sued the lawyers for
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, the lawyers asserted in
pari delicto and argued that the adverse-interest exception did
not apply.120 The lawyers asserted that the company received
some benefit in that the money from the transactions “helped the
[company] to pay down the [company’s] debt . . . and also
demonstrated the [i]nsiders’ good faith belief in the long term
viability of the [company].”121 The court admitted that “[t]hese
benefits may seem somewhat trivial considering the alleged
grandiose benefits that the insiders received from the
transactions.”122 Nonetheless, the court found these trivial
benefits sufficient to make the adverse-interest exception
inapplicable, reasoning that the exception only applies when “the

116

Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. Corp.), 353 B.R. 324, 368
(Bankr. D.D.C. 2006) (explaining that acts that are “ultimately injurious” to the
company do not fall within the adverse-interest exception if they provide “an
immediate benefit to the debtor at the expense of innocent third parties” and
comparing the harm suffered by the debtor to the harm suffered by a robber who is
imprisoned for his criminal misconduct as the “price of having enjoyed the
temporary benefit of his ill-gotten gains”).
117
Baena, 453 F.3d at 8.
118
Claybrook v. Broad & Cassel, P.A. (In re Scott Acquisition Corp.), 364 B.R.
562, 564 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (explaining that the insiders purchased the properties
from the company at an amount just sufficient for the company to pay the lender,
that shareholder approval was not requested, and that several insiders flipped the
properties for substantial profit).
119
Id. at 564–65.
120
Id. at 568.
121
Id.
122
Id.
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agent acts entirely in his or her own interest with no benefit to
the principal.”123
The analysis is even easier when company agents engage in
misconduct on behalf of the company with the assistance of
counsel.124 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit’s Cenco case is often cited for the proposition that “[f]raud
on behalf of a corporation is not the same as fraud against it.”125
It follows that fraud on behalf of the company is never adverse to
it.126 Even when the conduct results in substantial liability for
the company—as it typically does—the adverse-interest
exception does not apply.127
The New York Court of Appeals rejected the idea that a
client’s ultimate bankruptcy amounts to harm for purposes of the
adverse-interest exception. The court explained that harm from
discovery of the fraud cannot be the proper test because
“disclosure of corporate fraud nearly always injures the
corporation.”128 The court reasoned that, “[i]f that harm could be
taken into account, a corporation would be able to invoke the

123

Id. (citing Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Grumman Olson Indus.,
Inc. v. McConnell (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 329 B.R. 411, 426 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
124
Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. Corp.), 353 B.R. 324, 368
(Bankr. D.D.C. 2006) (quoting 3 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OR PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 829 (rev. ed. 2010)) (asserting that
“[f]raud on behalf of a corporation is not the same thing as fraud against it” and
explaining that the adverse-interest exception does not apply in cases in which there
is some short term benefit to the corporation by the alleged misconduct).
125
Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982).
126
Id.; see also AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 827 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“[I]n applying the in
pari delicto doctrine, New York law does not embrace the notion that any conscious
act of a fiduciary causing a corporation to break the law is against the corporation’s
charter and best interests.”).
127
See, e.g., Cobalt Multifamily Inv’rs I, LLC v. Shapiro, 857 F. Supp. 2d 419,
434–35 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that legal malpractice claims against the Certilman
law firm are barred under New York law because the client benefited from the
fraud—that the firm facilitated—in that some of the funds raised by the fraud were
used to pay promised returns to investors and the client retained some of the money
raised through the fraud). The court refused to allow the receiver to re-plead,
explaining that the receiver would have to allege the company “did not receive any
benefit—inadvertent or otherwise—as a result of the . . . fraud,” and that such an
allegation would contradict the allegations of the original complaint. Id. at 440; see
also infra notes 195–197 and accompanying text for discussion of claims that were
allowed to proceed under Connecticut and New Jersey law against two other law
firm defendants in the Cobalt case.
128
Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 953 (N.Y. 2010).
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adverse-interest exception and disclaim virtually every corporate
fraud . . . as soon as it was discovered and no longer helping the
company.”129 It is only when the corporation is the intended
victim, rather than the intended recipient, of the agent’s
fraudulent scheme that the law presumes the agent will not
communicate all material information to the principal.130
This interpretation of the adverse inference exception fails to
consider an attorney’s legal obligations. Competent attorneys are
bound to advise their clients’ agents against both stealing from
the company and stealing for the company.131 Neither is in the
company’s long-term financial interest.132 One creates liability
from the agent to the company and one will result in liability for
the company when it is discovered.133 It is not the lawyer’s
proper role to bet on nondetection of liability-creating conduct or
to weigh its possible benefits to a business entity client.134 A
129

Id.
Id. at 952.
131
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015)
(requiring attorneys to protect the organization when an agent is engaged in conduct
“that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that
reasonably might be imputed to the organization”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (obligating a lawyer to act
in the best interest of the client when an agent “intends to act in a way that violates
a legal obligation to the organization . . . or that reasonably can be foreseen to be
imputable to the organization and likely to result in substantial injury to it”).
132
See, e.g., Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that even
though there is intuitive appeal to the suggestion that the only victims of corporate
fraud are third parties, the company may also be a victim when we consider the long
term consequences, as in cases like Enron). Anytime a company is engaged in
conduct that creates substantial liability to third parties, the company will suffer
harm when that liability is realized, owner value decreases, fines are incurred,
and/or when the company is forced into bankruptcy. See, e.g., Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d
at 945–46, 948–49. The New York Court of Appeals describes the circumstances
leading to suit in the two consolidated cases. In the first case, when the Refco fraud
was revealed, the resulting harm was the company’s bankruptcy for the company,
precipitating the Litigation Trustee to file suit against the company’s lawyers and
others. Id. at 945–46. In the other case, AIG’s fraud did not result in bankruptcy but
instead, a reduction in stockholder equity, litigation and regulatory proceedings, and
fines. This harm was the basis of the derivative suit filed by shareholders against
AIG’s auditor. Id. at 948–49.
133
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
134
Schaefer, Loyal Disclosure, supra note 79, at 439–40. Cf. Pritchard, supra
note 88, at 186. Pritchard asserts that whether fraud benefits a corporation
“depends on how often the corporation gets caught.” Id. While this may be true as an
empirical matter, this view is inconsistent with a lawyer’s legal and professional
conduct obligations when representing an organizational client.
130
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competent lawyer may not simply withdraw from the
representation, but is obligated to take action to protect the
company’s interests in the face of agent misconduct that will
create liability for the company.135
It is absurd that the adverse-interest exception protects
lawyers from liability in the very situation that should trigger
lawyer liability. As a fiduciary, a lawyer must protect an
organizational client from an agent that orchestrates a
fraudulent scheme to enrich the client.136
But a narrow
interpretation of the adverse-interest exception provides that as
long as the fraudulent scheme was meant to enrich the
organization, the organization is barred from suing the attorney
who failed to protect it.137 This is nonsensical.138
Courts have expressed a fear that a broader reading of the
adverse-interest exception would allow those who stand in the
shoes of the company in litigation “to enjoy the benefit of
[miscreant agent] misconduct without suffering the harm.”139
But that argument misses three important points. First, even if
the adverse-interest exception is expanded, the company is not
off the hook. It will still have liability to third parties harmed by
the misconduct.140 The only question in expanding the adverseinterest exception is whether attorneys should escape liability for
violating a duty to a client. Second, holding outside counsel
responsible to the company for his or her role in misconduct is no
different from holding company insiders responsible to the
135
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2) cmt. f
(explaining steps a lawyer may take to address an organizational client’s agent’s
misconduct and noting that “a lawyer does not fulfill the lawyer’s duties to the
organizational client by withdrawing from the representation without attempting to
prevent the constituent’s wrongful act”).
136
See supra notes 131–135 and accompanying text.
137
See supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text (citing cases in which the
adverse-interest exception does not apply because agents were engaged in profitable
illegal conduct).
138
Harris, supra note 20, at 632 (“[T]he problem with imputation analysis and
the doctrine of adverse interest . . . in cases . . . against an organization’s lawyers, is
its logical corollary: even if aware of fraud or criminal wrongdoing within an
organizational client, the lawyer would have no duty to take steps to prevent that
conduct (or at least no liability for failure to fulfill that duty) as long as the
wrongdoers intended, however misguidedly, to benefit the organization.”).
139
Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 238 N.E.2d 941, 959 (N.Y. 2010).
140
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (describing
principal’s vicarious liability to third party harmed by agent’s conduct).
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company for their role in the misconduct.141 And third, holding
an attorney responsible for his or her misconduct need not mean
that counsel will bear the entire loss.142
C.

The Sole-Actor Exception to the Adverse-Interest Exception

Courts recognize an exception to the adverse-interest
exception when the agent who was engaged in misconduct and
the company are one and the same.143 Because the adverseinterest exception is based on the belief that an agent engaged in
misconduct would not disclose that information to the
organization,144 the sole-actor exception recognizes that if there is
no one in the organization from whom knowledge can be
concealed, then the organization should be imputed with
knowledge.145 If there is identity between the agent and the
company, then they are treated as one and the same.146 In short,
the sole-actor exception recognizes that imputation is not
appropriate when an agent is stealing from the company except
when the thief is the company’s sole actor.
The sole-actor inquiry is about control. Once it has been
established that the agent was acting adversely to the interests
of the company, the debate in these cases turns to whether there
was anyone else in control in the company that could have
stopped the agent.147 The company—or the party standing in its
141

See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
See infra note 332 and accompanying text.
143
Hagan v. Baird, 591 F. App’x 434, 441 (6th Cir. 2015) (refusing to apply the
adverse-interest exception where “agent and principal are effectively one and the
same, and in such a case, the agent’s fraudulent conduct will be attributed to the
principal”); Mediators, Inc. v. Manney, 105 F.3d 822, 827 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[W]here
the principal and agent are one and the same, the adverse-interest exception is itself
subject to an exception styled the ‘sole[-]actor’ rule.”).
144
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
145
Tolz v. Proskauer Rose LLP (In re Fuzion Technologies Grp., Inc.), 332 B.R.
225, 237–38 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005) (explaining that in prior decisions, the sole-actor
exception was applied when the agent was “either . . . the only sole shareholder, or
had no one to whom he could impart his knowledge, or from whom he could conceal
it”).
146
Reider v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 784 A.2d 464, 472 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001)
(explaining that when the sole owner loots the company, it is fair to impute “the selfdealing conduct of the looter to the looted corporation”).
147
Cobalt Multifamily Inv’rs I, LLC v. Shapiro, No. 06 Civ. 6468(KMW)(MHD),
2009 WL 2058530, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2009) (explaining that the sole-actor rule
can apply when multiple people control the corporation, when all of those people are
involved in the fraud, and that the exception does not apply when the corporation
142
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shoes—argues that there were other individuals who could have
stopped the illegal conduct if they had been informed of it.148 The
law firm or other third party defendant argues that the company
was completely controlled by the individuals engaged in the
misconduct.149
It is inconsistent with the law of organizational attorney
fiduciary duty that the “sole-actor” analysis only comes into play
in the narrow circumstance of insiders stealing from the
organizational client.150 A lawyer is obligated to act competently
to protect the organizational client from liability anytime an
insider is engaged in misconduct, whether stealing from the
company or stealing for the company.151 If the company and the
“has owners or managers who were innocent of the fraud and could have stopped the
fraud if they had been aware of . . . it”); Fuzion Technologies, 332 B.R. at 239
(holding that under the sole-actor exception to the exception, imputation is
prohibited “[i]f there was at least one honest officer, director, shareholder, or other
insider who would have taken appropriate action to rectify the wrongdoing”).
148
Fuzion Technologies, 332 B.R. at 238 (explaining that the trustee argued that
the sole-actor exception was inapplicable because certain directors and shareholders
did not know about the agent’s fraud and “could and would” have taken steps to end
the fraud if they had been advised of it); Sharp Int’l Corp. v. KPMG LLP (In re
Sharp Int’l Corp.), 278 B.R. 28, 38–39 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying motion to
dismiss by auditor finding allegations of complaint regarding an innocent thirteen
percent shareholder on the board who could have stopped the fraud sufficient to
create question of whether the sole-actor rule was applicable).
149
Sharp Int’l Corp., 278 B.R. at 38 (explaining that the defendant argued that
the complaint supported the applicability of the sole-actor exception by alleging the
company had only three officers who “ran the company and had control over the
fraudulent transactions.”).
150
Stated another way, it would be consistent with attorney fiduciary duty for
the default rule to be no imputation of agent misconduct to the company for
purposes of in pari delicto, whether stealing from or for the company, except when
the agent is the company’s “sole actor.” Even then, this Article would define a
company controlled by a sole actor—that is, one for which imputation is
appropriate—in very narrow circumstances in which the company has no other
innocent stakeholders that the lawyer could have protected. See infra notes 327–329
and accompanying text. This is a different interpretation of sole actor than courts
that attempt to broadly define sole actor as an exception to the adverse-interest
exception so that imputation is appropriate. See, e.g., USACM Liquidating Tr. v.
Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1221 (D. Nev. 2011) (describing
interpretations of sole actor within the no innocent decision-maker rule that allow a
conclusion of sole actor—and thus, allow imputation—even when there were other
decision makers in the company who lacked veto power).
151
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015)
(requiring attorneys to protect the organization when an agent is engaged in conduct
“that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization or a violation of law that
reasonably might be imputed to the organization”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
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bad sole actor are one and the same, then imputation may be
appropriate. Otherwise, imputation should not bar a claim
against counsel regardless of the variety of agent misconduct.
D. Dismissal of Such Claims Protects the Sanctity of the Courts
as Bodies That Do Not Mediate Disputes Between
Wrongdoers
A stated policy underlying the in pari delicto doctrine is
protection of the sanctity of the courts.152 Courts refuse to
participate in resolving disputes between wrongdoers in order to
avoid becoming a party to the misconduct.153
It is ironic then that courts in business lawyer malpractice
cases regularly and seriously give consideration to attorney
arguments that a claim should be dismissed because counsel was
This argument is
facilitating beneficial illegal conduct.154
necessary to avoid the adverse-interest exception, because if
illegal conduct benefited the business in the short term, then
agent conduct is imputed to the company and in pari delicto
applies.155 But of course it is also a violation of a lawyer’s
fiduciary duty to her client to have participated in illegal but

LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (obligating lawyers to act in
the best interest of the client when an agent “intends to act in a way that violates a
legal obligation to the organization . . . or that reasonably can be foreseen to be
imputable to the organization and likely to result in substantial injury to it”).
152
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985)
(holding that one of two underlying grounds supporting the doctrine is “that courts
should not lend their good offices to mediating disputes among wrongdoers”).
153
Id.
154
See, e.g., Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2006) (“A fraud by top
management . . . is not in the long-term interest of the company; but . . . it profits
the company in the first instance and the company is still civilly and criminally
liable.”); Cobalt Multifamily Inv’rs I, LLC v. Shapiro, No. 06 Civ. 6468(KMW)(MHD),
2009 WL 2058530, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2009) (finding that the adverse-interest
exception is inapplicable where the corporation benefits to any extent from agents’
fraud); Kirschner v. Grant Thornton LLP, No. 07 Civ. 11604(GEL), 2009 WL
1286326, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2009) (determining that the adverse-interest
exception does not apply because the illegal conduct was beneficial to Refco, and
noting that “[i]ndeed, the gravamen of the Trustee’s allegations is not that the
insiders stole assets from Refco, but rather that the insiders’ fraudulent scheme was
to steal for Refco”).
155
Shapiro, 2008 WL 833237, at *7.

2016]

IN PARI DELICTO DECONSTRUCTED

1031

profitable misconduct.156 So, rather than avoiding entanglement
in misconduct, courts are using the violation of an attorney’s duty
as grounds for rewarding the attorney with a dismissal.
Dismissing an attorney malpractice claim is fundamentally
different from dismissing a case against a “classic” coconspirator. Take an example from the AIG II case.157 AIG had
conspired with the company General Reinsurance Corporation
(“Gen Re”) to make it appear that AIG had a legitimate insurance
contract.158 As a result of the transaction, AIG was able to report
a fake $500 million increase in its insurance reserves and
premiums, while Gen Re was paid $5 million for its part in the
When the conspiracy was uncovered, both
conspiracy.159
companies faced substantial liability and AIG paid an $825
million settlement.160 When AIG shareholders filed a derivative
suit against Gen Re, the Delaware Court of Chancery explained
that Delaware’s in pari delicto doctrine barred the claim.161
Concluding that no exception should apply to allow the claim, the
court explained such exceptions would require courts to engage
in inefficient accounting.162 Because both conspiring parties had
their own motives, neither is the victim and could assert claims
against the other.163 In sorting out such claims, “the court would
have to look at each of the corporate wrongdoers, examine how,
why, and through whom each committed illegal acts, and then
come to some ultimate determination of how costs should be
shifted among conspirators” and may devolve to the court
determining “[which company] got more of the take from the
scheme relative to its harms.”164

156

32 C.F.R. § 776.69 (2016).
AIG II, 976 A.2d 872, 877 (Del. Ch. 2009).
158
Id. at 879.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 883 (“In applying the doctrine [under Delaware law], there is no doubt
that under the general rule, AIG is barred from recovering against the Third-Party
Defendants[, including Gen Re].”).
162
Id. at 893.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 894. In contrast, the Chancery Court explained that a claim against a
lawyer or auditor for malpractice is more akin to a claim against an insider for
breach of fiduciary duty to which in pari delicto is inapplicable. Id. at 889–90, n.49.
157
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Unlike the AIG-type co-conspirator, a lawyer is engaged to
provide a legitimate service: legal advice and assistance to an
organizational client.165 A legal malpractice claim relies upon
allegations that the lawyer failed to act in a reasonably prudent
manner and the client was harmed as a result.166 Considering
the merits of such a claim is not unseemly, as it would have been
in looking at AIG’s claim against Gen Re; it is what courts do in
any legal malpractice case.167
By dismissing these legal malpractice claims without
consideration, the courts are signaling that there are no
consequences to lawyers for violating fiduciary duties to
organizational clients.168 Ironically, the application of in pari
delicto in these cases makes courts participants in lawyer
misconduct.
E.

Denying Relief to Plaintiffs in Such Cases Deters Illegality

Courts also justify the in pari delicto doctrine on the ground
that it deters illegal conduct.169 Courts assert that applying the
doctrine incentivizes businesses to use care in selecting and
supervising agents.170 One court explained that imputation for
165

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (describing a lawyer’s duties to a client as including advancing the
client’s lawful objectives, acting competently and diligently, fulfilling duties of
loyalty, and fulfill valid contractual obligations).
166
Id. § 48 (describing the elements of a claim against a lawyer for professional
negligence).
167
Id.
168
Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 960 (N.Y. 2010) (Ciparik, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the majority’s holding regarding application of the in pari
delicto doctrine creates “a per se rule that fraudulent insider conduct bars any
actions against outside professionals by derivative plaintiffs or litigation trustees for
complicitous assistance to the corrupt insider or negligent failure to detect
wrongdoing”); see also Michels, supra note 92, at 342 (describing the Kirschner
decision as “effectively insulat[ing] attorneys from all liability [except in the case of
theft from the client] for failure to report an executive’s wrongdoing to higher-ups in
the organization”).
169
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985)
(finding that one of two underlying grounds underlying in pari delicto is that
“denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means of deterring
illegality”).
170
See Goldin v. Primavera Familienstiftung, Tag Assocs., Ltd. (In re Granite
Partners, L.P.), 194 B.R. 318, 328 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (asserting that denying
relief to a wrongdoer through the in pari delicto doctrine deters illegal conduct);
Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 951 (“The risk of loss from the unauthorized acts of a
dishonest agent falls on the principal that selected the agent.” (quoting Andre
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purposes of applying in pari delicto recognizes “that principals,
rather than third parties, are best-suited to police their chosen
agents and to make sure they do not take actions that ultimately
do more harm than good.”171
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis in the Cenco case is often
relied upon for its deterrance analysis.172 The court framed the
issue as weighing two alteratives to determine which would have
a greater deterrent effect on corporate fraud: allowing the
company to shift the entire cost of fraud to a negligent auditor or
not allowing such cost shifting.173 The court admitted that
holding a third party auditor liable for its negligence might cause
it and firms like it to be “more diligent and honest in the
future.”174 But the court went on to reason that if the company is
allowed to shift the cost of wrongdoing “entirely to the auditor,”
that would reduce the incentive to hire honest managers and
monitor their behavior.175 Even though the court recognized that
many shareholders do not play an active role in hiring and
supervising managers, the court explained that the shareholders
delegate this duty to the board and should bear responsibility
when the board-selected managers commit fraud on behalf of the
company.176
While recognizing that the company and its
shareholders may not ultimately be net beneficiaries of such

Romanelli, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 875 N.Y.S.2d 14, 15 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009))). But
see Welt v. Sirmans, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1396, 1402 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (asserting that
permitting a bankruptcy trustee to recover against debtor’s former attorneys “would
not send unqualified signals to shareholders that they need not be alert to
managerial fraud since they may later recover full indemnification for that fraud
from third party participants”).
171
Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 953.
172
See, e.g., id. (relying on Cenco for the proposition that “the presumption of
imputation reflects the recognition that principals, rather than third parties, are
best-suited to police their chosen agents and to make sure they do not take actions
that ultimately do more harm than good” (citing Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman,
686 F.2d 449, 455 (7th Cir. 1982))).
173
Cenco, 686 F.2d at 455 (“From the standpoint of deterrence, the question is
whether the type of fraud that engulfed Cenco . . . will be deterred more effectively if
Cenco can shift the entire cost of the fraud from itself . . . to the independent auditor
who failed to prevent the fraud. We think not.”).
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 455–56.
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fraud, the court reasoned that shareholders should not be able to
escape all responsibility by holding a third party—in this case,
the auditor—responsible.177
There are two significant flaws in this deterrence analysis.
First, the company—whether through shareholders, boards, or
other managers, depending on the form of the entity—typically is
not in a better position than company lawyers to monitor and
stop illegal conduct by agents on behalf of the company.178 It is
the lawyer’s role to know the law, to advise about conduct that
could result in legal liability, and to seek out higher authorities
in a company who will take the steps necessary to avoid liability
by correcting course.179 Shareholders, boards, and upper-level
management are much less likely to have knowledge about
company agents and their conduct than the participating
lawyer.180 In fact, those other groups are relying upon the
lawyers to help them monitor the insiders.181 So, as between
shareholders and boards on one hand and attorneys on the other,
attorneys are in the better position to deter misconduct if they
have the incentive to do so.182
The second flaw is in framing the question as whether the
company should be able to shift “all responsibility” to third party
professionals.183 Holding attorneys liable for their negligence

177

Id. at 456.
Pritchard, supra note 88, at 197 (“[S]hareholders are not realistically in any
position to monitor their managers’ conduct toward third parties, and shareholders
might well be willing to pay higher fees to accountants and lawyers who help ferret
out fraud by the corporation.”); DeMott, supra note 60, at 348–49 (discussing that
organizational clients in these cases had contracted for “expert monitoring services
that shareholders and directors lack expertise to provide”).
179
See supra notes 131–135 and accompanying text.
180
See supra note 178.
181
Michels, supra note 92, at 356 (acknowledging the rationale that imputation
encourages principals to monitor agents, but noting the “irony of allowing this
rationale to justify the wholesale rejection of a corporation’s claims against their
failed lawyer gatekeeper”); see supra note 178.
182
Recent Case, Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941 (N.Y. 2010), 124
HARV. L. REV. 1797, 1802–03 (2011) (asserting that the Kirschner decision will not
have the desired effect of deterring corporate wrongdoing because it denies recovery
to the company who hired outside professionals to ensure legal compliance while
immunizing professionals who were in a position to prevent wrongdoing).
183
See, e.g., Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 455–56 (7th Cir.
1982).
178
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does not mean that the full responsibility for damages arising out
of corporate fraud will be shifted to attorneys.184
Greater deterrence of illegal conduct could be accomplished
by not permitting the in pari delicto defense in these cases. A
lawyer, as a fiduciary, has an obligation to act competently and
loyally to protect an organizational client from liability at the
hands of misguided insiders.185 If lawyers are never held
accountable to their clients for failing to do so, there is little
incentive to perform this difficult job.186 Civil liability is a
powerful enforcement mechanism.187 The prospect of malpractice
liability would give lawyers a strong financial incentive to fulfill
fiduciary duties to their clients.188
Courts sometimes assert that lawyers already have adequate
incentives to fulfill these duties. These incentives include
potential suits by the victims of the fraud, the prospect of
professional discipline, and the possibility of criminal liability.189
184

See infra notes 330–332 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text.
186
The lawyer-advisor’s job is particularly difficult because of the strong
pressure to please client decision makers. See Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the
Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and
Ethics of Financial Risk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209, 1245 (2011) (describing
the psychological risk involved in anxious-to-please lawyers “ ‘get[ting] comfortable’
with what the client proposes”). In order to protect business clients from fraud
liability, lawyers must not focus on technical compliance with some aspect of the law
but rather upon moral intuition about whether clients are engaged in a
misrepresentation that may amount to fraud. Eric C. Chaffee, An Interdisciplinary
Analysis of the Use of Ethical Intuition in Legal Compliance Decisionmaking for
Business Entities, 74 MD. L. REV. 497, 523–25 (2015) (describing how a lawyer’s
“[m]oral [i]ntuition [h]elps to [p]rotect [b]usiness [e]ntities”).
187
In contrast, if we conceptualize the attorney’s duty to intervene to prevent
serious misconduct as solely an ethical obligation to protect the public, then it is
unlikely that lawyers will take the duty seriously because of the lack of
consequences. See COFFEE JR., supra note 76, at 230 (“Academics with tenure are
notoriously demanding of practitioners struggling to survive in competitive markets.
But the overlooked problem with their prescription is its implementation. Ethical
norms lack any meaningful mechanism for their enforcement, and bar associations
are not about to take action against attorneys for failing to consider the public
interest.”).
188
The Cenco court, which ultimately barred an auditor malpractice claim based
on in pari delicto, acknowledged that allowing the claim to proceed would incentivize
auditors to be “more diligent and honest in the future.” Cenco, 686 F.2d at 455.
189
See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 958 (N.Y. 2010) (“[A]n
outside professional . . . whose corporate client experiences a rapid or disastrous
decline in fortune precipitated by insider fraud does not skate away unscathed. In
short, outside professionals—underwriters, law firms and especially accounting
185
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This argument overlooks the rarity of these other forms of
liability.190 It also fails to recognize that civil liability would
provide an added incentive for law firms—not just individual
lawyers—to manage risk in this area, which may result in
greater protection of business clients.191 Finally, discipline,
criminal liability, and civil liability to third parties do not
compensate the victim of the lawyer’s professional failing: the
organizational client.192 The client should be compensated for the
harm caused by its fiduciary’s failures, irrespective of the
prospect of other liability for the lawyer.193
III. IN PARI DELICTO VARIATIONS: ARE THESE APPROACHES
MORE CONSISTENT WITH BUSINESS ATTORNEY FIDUCIARY DUTY?
Some jurisdictions have taken a more flexible approach to in
pari delicto in the context of business entity claims against
attorneys and auditors who have failed to protect their business
clients from liability.194 Some jurisdictions have created new
exceptions to the doctrine, while others have found the doctrine
inapplicable against certain categories of plaintiffs. In exploring

firms—already are at risk for large settlements and judgments in the litigation that
inevitably follows the collapse of an Enron, or a Worldcom or a Refco or an AIG-type
scandal.”).
190
Id. (noting that many third party professionals have settled suits with
shareholders in the same cases, but the lawyers are not listed among those who
settled). Of course, attorney Joseph Collins was convicted for his role in the fraud.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Such convictions would have a deterrent
effect on attorney participation in client fraud if they were not so rare.
191
Law firms have civil liability exposure for their lawyers’ malpractice, but do
not face professional discipline. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2014) (providing for discipline for lawyers, and not law firms); see also Vincent
R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice in a Changing Profession: The Role of Contract
Principles, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 489, 492–93 (2013) (asserting that despite the
existence of other attorney conduct enforcement mechanisms, discipline and
malpractice suits “form the essential backbone of modern legal ethics”).
192
NCP Litig. Tr. v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 887 (N.J. 2006) (allowing an
auditor to escape liability for its negligence violates principles of fairness and does
nothing to deter auditor wrongdoing in the future).
193
It is a valid concern that uncapped exposure to liability may have negative
implications for lawyers, auditors, and their clients. See, e.g., AIG I, 965 A.2d 763,
828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009). However, there are ways to address these concerns short
of insulating lawyers and auditors from malpractice liability.
194
As in the prior Part, this Part also considers auditor cases in addition to
lawyer cases. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text (explaining that the
cases are analogous).
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these and other variations, this Part considers whether these
approaches are more consistent with attorney fiduciary duty
than the stricter approach discussed above.
A.

Broader Reading of the Adverse-Interest Exception

Some jurisdictions have interpreted the adverse-interest
exception broadly enough to encompass conduct that only
provides the “benefit” of temporarily extending the life of an
insolvent company.195 In other words, the agent misconduct will
be treated as adverse to the company if temporary life support
was the only benefit provided.196 The impact of this exception
will mean no imputation, and as a result, the possibility of
liability for lawyers.197
Expanding the adverse-interest exception to include agent
misconduct when the only benefit is temporarily delaying the
company’s death is more consistent with an attorney’s obligations
to act in the best interests of clients in the face of an agent’s
liability-creating conduct.198 It recognizes that the client’s cause
of action against an attorney should not be foreclosed when the
only benefit to the client was a meaningless one.
However, this exception misses the mark by not going far
enough. For example, assume that a solvent company’s agents
seek an attorney’s assistance defrauding third parties for the
benefit of the company. Even though an attorney has a fiduciary
duty to the company to protect it in this situation,199 an attorney
who instead facilitates the misconduct could successfully invoke
the in pari delicto defense if sued for malpractice. Even if the
jurisdiction employs an expanded adverse-interest exception like
195
Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1347–48 (7th Cir. 1983) (prolonging
company’s insolvency is a detriment to the company); Cobalt Multifamily Inv’rs I,
LLC v. Shapiro, 857 F. Supp. 2d 419, 431–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining that under
Connecticut and New Jersey law, the adverse-interest exception is available if the
fraudulent conduct only extended the life of an insolvent company); NCP Litig. Tr.,
901 A.2d at 888 (“[W]e find that inflating a corporation’s revenues and enabling a
corporation to continue in business ‘past the point of insolvency’ cannot be
considered a benefit to the corporation.”).
196
Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1348.
197
Cobalt Multifamily Inv’rs I, LLC, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 435 (allowing the
Receiver’s claims to proceed against law firms under Connecticut and New Jersey
law).
198
See supra notes 131–135 and accompanying text.
199
See supra notes 131–135 and accompanying text.
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that described here, it would not apply in our hypothetical
scenario because the fraud was not used merely to extend the life
of an insolvent company.200 Accordingly, this expansion is a step
in the right direction, but does not fully address the issue.201
B.

Bad Faith Exception

In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny
Health
Education
&
Research
Foundation
v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (“AHERF”),202 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that an agent’s fraud will not be imputed to
the principal in cases in which a third party does not deal in good
faith with the principal.203 In the case, AHERF’s auditor Coopers
& Lybrand (“C&L”) allegedly colluded with AHERF’s CFO to
misrepresent the company’s finances.204 The court noted that
public policy considerations should come into play in determining
the availability of in pari delicto and acknowledged the
competing policies at play.205 The court explained the important
role that imputation plays in protecting people who transact
business with corporations.206 From there, the court determined
that imputation of agent misconduct is appropriate when the
200

Cf. supra note 195 and accompanying text.
Another interpretation of the adverse-interest exception that is more
consistent with attorney fiduciary duty is found in Colorado where the exception
encompasses fraudulent conduct. See Okimoto v. Yougjun Cai, No. 13 Civ.
4494(RMB), 2015 WL 3404334, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2015) (acknowledging that
Colorado extends the adverse-interest exception to include not only fraud and looting
but also fraud related misconduct, such as agents making fraudulent
misrepresentations in corporate filings). To the extent that this exception would still
allow the imputation of profitable but illegal—but not fraudulent—misconduct of
company agents, this exception is not fully aligned with the law of attorney fiduciary
duty.
202
989 A.2d 313, 313 (Pa. 2010). In the case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
accepted certification of two questions on petition of the Third Circuit of the U.S.
Court of Appeals. Id. at 318.
203
Id. at 339.
204
Id. at 317 (describing how AHERF’s CFO allegedly “knowingly falsified
corporate finances” with the assistance of C&L agents who issued a “clean” audit
despite their knowledge of the fraud, resulting in the AHERF board’s deception to
the detriment of AHERF).
205
Id. at 330–31. The court concluded that the state does not agree with the
degree to which the Cenco decision prioritizes “incentivizing internal corporate
monitoring over the objectives of the traditional schemes governing liability in
contract and in tort, including fair compensation and deterrence of wrongdoing.” Id.
at 332.
206
Id. at 335.
201
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third party acted in good faith, even if the third party was
negligent.207 Thus, in pari delicto would continue to be available
in such cases.208
The court concluded that a different rule should apply in
cases of collusion between auditor and company agent, because
the justification for imputation—protecting third parties who
rely on the agent’s authority—is absent.209 The court reasoned it
would be “ill advised, if not perverse,” to impute knowledge to the
corporation when the auditor “actively and intentionally”
prevented the corporation’s governing body from receiving
knowledge of the fraud.210 The court asserted that its holding is
supported by agency principles, arguing that such principles do
not justify imputation when secretive, collusive activity occurred
between auditor and agent.211 Accordingly, the court held that
“defensive imputation” is available to a defendant who dealt with
the principal in good faith and is unavailable where the
defendant “materially has not dealt in good faith with the
principal.”212
There is a principled reason to expand the imputation
exception beyond cases of attorney bad faith. The AHERF court
attempts to draw a line between cases when the third party
professional should or should not be protected in his or her
reliance upon agent authority.213 The problem with this line
drawing in the case of an attorney is that an attorney is never
justified in relying upon the agent’s authority to engage in
misconduct on the company’s behalf.214 Whether the attorney is
207

Id. This is the appropriate outcome considering the principal’s responsibility
for empowering the agent and determining it does not undermine tort and contract
law to deny recovery where the agent’s culpability exceeded that of the defendant.
208
Id.
209
Id. at 336.
210
Id.
211
Id. at 337.
212
Id. at 339; see also Kirschner v. K&L Gates LLP, 46 A.3d 737, 764 (Pa. 2012)
(concluding that allegations that law firm favored interests of company CEO over
that of the client during its investigation of CEO’s alleged fraud amounted to an
allegation of bad faith sufficient to overcome imputation under Pennsylvania law).
213
See supra notes 206–212 and accompanying text.
214
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2) cmt. d (AM
LAW INST. 2000) (“[A] lawyer is not bound by a constituent’s instruction to a lawyer
to . . . assist future or ongoing acts that the lawyer reasonably believes to be
unlawful. Such an instruction also does not remove the lawyer’s duty to protect the
best interests of the organizational client.”).
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negligent in failing to report the agent’s misconduct up-theladder or intentionally colludes with the agent to hide the
misconduct from higher authorities in the company, the outcome
is the same for the organizational client: the attorney has
deprived the principal/client of information that the attorney had
a legal obligation to provide.215 In both cases—negligent conduct
and intentional misconduct—the attorney had a duty not to allow
the misguided agent to speak on behalf of the principal/client.216
The attorney should have liability in both cases217 and should
find no shelter by imputing the insider’s misconduct to the
organizational client.
C.

The Innocent Decision-Maker Exception

Some courts within the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit have recognized an “innocent decision-maker”
exception to the in pari delicto doctrine.218 Courts applying this
exception have refused to impute agent fraud to the company
when there was at least one decision maker among the
company’s managers or shareholders who was both innocent of
the misconduct and could have stopped it if he or she had been

215

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014)
(describing professional conduct obligation to report agent misconduct up-theladder); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(3)
(explaining the attorney’s obligation to act in the best interests of the organizational
client in the face of conduct that will cause substantial liability to or for the
organization).
216
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(3).
217
Id. § 96, cmt. f (discussing whether a lawyer should have liability for failing
to take appropriate measures to address constituent misconduct is judged by
whether the attorney violated the duty of care—that is, whether the attorney acted
with the competence normally exercised under similar circumstances by lawyers).
218
Sharp Int’l Corp. v. KPMG LLP (In re Sharp Int’l Corp.), 278 B.R. 28, 36–39
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002) (refusing to dismiss case where plaintiff alleged presence of
an innocent shareholder on the board with the ability to end the fraudulent activity);
Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 49 F. Supp. 2d 644, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(permitting plaintiff to re-plead to allege innocent manager who could have
prevented fraud in auditor malpractice case); Wechsler v. Squadron, Ellenoff,
Plesent & Scheinfeld, L.L.P., 212 B.R. 34, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (allowing plaintiff to
amend complaint to allege existence of innocent member of management who could
have prevented fraud if he had known of it); CEPA Consulting, Ltd. v. Touche Ross
& Co. (In re Wedtech Secs. Litig.), 138 B.R. 5, 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (refusing to
dismiss accountant malpractice case on basis that agents engaged in misconduct
were not the company’s sole shareholders).
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made aware of it.219 The Second Circuit has not had occasion to
resolve the issue,220 but has noted the possibility that the rule is
an outgrowth of a misunderstanding about the sole-actor
exception.221 Outside of the Second Circuit, it does not appear
that courts recognize such an exception.222
This innocent decision-maker exception aligns well with
lawyer fiduciary duty. As noted earlier, lawyers have a duty to
act prudently to protect an organizational client from liability.223
One step toward fulfilling this obligation is reporting concerns of
agent misconduct up-the-ladder to higher authorities in the
organization.224 This allows the innocent decision makers in the
company to protect it from liability.225 Even when company
management refuses or fails to address the misconduct,
professional conduct rules in some jurisdictions permit lawyers to
protect entity clients by taking the additional step of revealing
information outside of company management, such as to a
shareholder who could pressure the company to address the
issue.226

219

Wechsler, 212 B.R. at 36 (deciding that imputation is only appropriate if “all
relevant shareholders and/or decisionmakers are involved in the fraud”).
220
CBI Holding Co., Inc. v. Ernst & Young, 529 F.3d 432, 447 (2d Cir. 2008)
(finding the adverse-interest exception applicable and concluding it was unnecessary
to address an innocent-insider exception); Bennett Funding Grp., Inc. v. Kirkpatrick
& Lockhart LLP, 336 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2003) (deciding it was unnecessary to
resolve the legal issue of an innocent decision-maker exception because there was no
innocent decision maker under the facts).
221
CBI Holding Co., Inc., 529 F.3d at 470 n.5.
222
Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453 F.3d 1, 8–9 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding no authority for
an innocent decision-maker exception under Massachusetts law); USACM
Liquidating Tr. v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1221 (D. Nev.
2011) (“To the extent some courts have fashioned an innocent[-]insider exception to
imputation or in pari delicto, as opposed to the sole[-]actor rule, the Court concludes
Nevada would not follow those decisions.”); Cohen v. Morgan Schiff & Co., Inc. (In re
Friedman’s Inc.), 394 B.R. 623, 633–34 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2008) (noting that its
decision does not turn on an innocent decision-maker exception to imputation).
223
See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text.
224
See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text.
225
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. f (AM.
LAW INST. 2000) (describing steps the lawyer may take to protect the organization as
including referring the matter to “someone within the organization having authority
to prevent the prospective harm” or seeking intervention from the board or
independent directors).
226
17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(i), (iii) (2016); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.13(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015); see also Schaefer, Loyal Disclosure, supra note 79
(discussing that, when confidentiality rules do not prohibit disclosure, a lawyer’s
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When a lawyer does not give an innocent decision maker the
opportunity to act, the lawyer has deprived the company of the
opportunity to avoid liability. In this scenario, it is sensible that
the lawyer should not be allowed to invoke the in pari delicto
defense; even though some of its agents were involved in
misconduct, other agents may have acted to protect it if they had
been given the opportunity.227
Courts and commentators have dismissed the innocent
decision-maker exception as a misunderstanding of the sole-actor
exception to the adverse-interest exception.228 They note that the
innocent decision-maker exception is the flip side of the sole-actor
exception—and the sole-actor exception only comes into play
when an agent is stealing from the company and not when the
agent is engaged in misconduct for the benefit of the company.229
A misunderstanding may very well be the origin of the
innocent decision-maker exception.230 Nonetheless, the innocent
decision-maker exception achieves a result consistent with
attorney fiduciary duty. It recognizes: (1) that both stealing from
and stealing for the organizational client are against client
interests, and (2) if the lawyer could have told an innocent
decision maker who could have protected the client but did not,
fiduciary duty to organizational client obligates lawyer to disclose confidences when
doing so will protect the organizational client).
227
See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text, for reasons why conduct
should not be imputed to the organizational client under such circumstances. It is
arguable that the existence of an innocent stakeholder—even one who has no
management role and thus is not a decision maker—is grounds to avoid imputation.
For additional discussion, see infra notes 328–329 and accompanying text.
228
CBI Holding Co., Inc. v. Ernst & Young, 529 F.3d 432, 448 n.5 (2d Cir. 2008)
(finding the district court judge’s analysis of an innocent decision-maker exception
“and its likely genesis as a product of courts’ confusion regarding the relationship
between the normal rule of imputation, the adverse[-]interest exception to that rule,
and the sole[-]actor exception to be extremely persuasive”); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v.
Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763, 825 (Del. Ch. 2009) (finding that the trend in New York is
“strongly against” an innocent insider exception); Jonathan Witmer-Rich & Mark
Herrmann, Corporate Complicity Claims: Why There Is No Innocent Decision-Maker
Exception to Imputing an Officer’s Wrongdoing to a Bankrupt Corporation, 74 TENN.
L. REV. 47, 91 (2006) (arguing that the innocent decision-maker exception is a
doctrinal error mischaracterizing the sole-actor exception and should be rejected).
229
CBI Holding Co., Inc., 529 F.3d at 447 n.5; Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d at
825; Witmer-Rich & Herrmann, supra note 228, at 91.
230
The authorities cited at supra note 228 are certainly persuasive that this is
the reason the exception developed. But the fact that the exception was arrived at
through a misunderstanding does not undercut the fact that it is legally sound for
the reasons explained here.

2016]

IN PARI DELICTO DECONSTRUCTED

1043

the lawyer has not fulfilled the duty owed to his or her
organizational client.231 As long as courts continue to categorize
some agent misconduct as being in the company’s interest,232
courts will not recognize the logic of a broad innocent decisionmaker exception. After all, what is the value of an attorney
alerting an innocent decision maker in an effort to stop what may
be considered beneficial misconduct?
D. Special Treatment for Claims Brought by Bankruptcy
Trustees or Receivers
Section 541 of the bankruptcy code provides that the
property of the bankruptcy estate includes “all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case.”233 Most courts have concluded that anyone standing in the
shoes of the company is subject to all defenses against it at the
time the case commenced—that is, those defenses that would
have been good against the company—including in pari delicto.234
However, a minority of courts have determined that bankruptcy
trustees should not be subject to the in pari delicto defense,
reasoning that it is equitable to allow the trustee to recover on
behalf of the innocent creditors.235
231

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2), (3) (AM.
LAW INST. 2000).
232
See supra notes 115–130 and accompanying text (discussing courts’
distinction between profitable and harmful illegal conduct).
233
11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1) (West 2014).
234
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437 F.3d
1145, 1150 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that a claim subject to the defense of in pari
delicto at commencement of bankruptcy is subject to the same defense when brought
by the bankruptcy trustee); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. RF Lafferty &
Co., Inc., 267 F.3d 340, 357 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that § 541 expresses Congress’s
intent that the bankruptcy trustee have the same claims and be subject to the same
defenses as the debtor at the commencement of the bankruptcy); Hill v. Gibson
Dunn & Crutcher, LLP (In re ms55, Inc.), 338 B.R. 883, 893 n.4 (Bankr. D. Colo.
2006) (“Whether subjecting the bankruptcy trustee to an in pari delicto defense is
good policy or bad, it is good bankruptcy law.”).
235
See, e.g., Tolz v. Proskauer Rose LLP (In re Fuzion Techs. Grp., Inc.), 332
B.R. 225, 231 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005). Two law review articles have influenced
courts’ debate about the wisdom of applying in pari delicto to bankruptcy trustees:
Tanvir Alam, Fraudulent Advisors Exploit Confusion in the Bankruptcy Code: How
In Pari Delicto Has Been Perverted To Prevent Recovery for Innocent Creditors, 77
AM. BANK. L.J. 305, 330 (2003) (asserting bankruptcy trustee should not be subject
to in pari delicto because it is an equitable defense and the beneficiaries of the claim
are innocent creditors), and Jeffrey Davis, Ending the Nonsense: The In Pari Delicto

1044

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1003

Outside of the § 541 setting, some courts have determined
that receivers, in various contexts, should not be subject to the in
pari delicto defense on public policy grounds.236 For example, in
Reneker v. Offill, a Northern District of Texas court determined
that a court-appointed special receiver in an SEC enforcement
action should not be barred by in pari delicto from pursuing
client AmeriFirst’s legal malpractice claims.237 The receiver
asserted that the lawyers had committed malpractice by failing
to properly advise AmeriFirst in offering securities for sale to the
public, resulting in liability to third parties.238 The law firm
asserted that in pari delicto applied because two AmeriFirst
agents were engaged in fraudulent conduct related to offering the
securities.239 The court did not impute the agents’ conduct to
AmeriFirst, reasoning that the distinction between agents and
corporation is reinforced by appointment of a receiver and that in
pari delicto would undermine the goal of the receivership, which
is ultimately to turn over proceeds to the receivership estate for
the defrauded investors and other innocent victims.240

Doctrine Has Nothing to Do with What Is § 541 Property of the Bankruptcy Estate, 21
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 519, 522 (2005) (arguing that as a matter of federal
bankruptcy policy, in pari delicto should not bar claims brought by the bankruptcy
trustee who is acting on behalf of innocent creditors). See also Marc S. Kirschner, In
Pari Delicto Doctrine in Lawsuits Against Third Parties After Failed Leveraged
Buyouts, 23 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. ART. 2, at *6 (2014) (discussing public
policy arguments favoring innocent trustees as representatives of creditors not being
subject to the in pari delicto defense).
236
See, e.g., Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 754–55 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding
that, in the context of fraudulent conveyance action, appointment of receiver
removed the wrongdoer such that in pari delicto should not bar the claim); Klein v.
Widmark, No. 2:11–cv–01097, 2015 WL 5038543, at *5 (D. Utah Aug. 26, 2015)
(allowing receiver to pursue a fraudulent transfer claim without the bar of in pari
delicto, reasoning that the recovered funds would not benefit the wrongdoer); Zayed
v. Associated Bank, N.A., Civ. No. 13–232(DSD/JSM), 2015 WL 4635789, at *3 (D.
Minn. Aug. 4, 2015) (denying motion to dismiss, reasoning that appointed receiver
was not subject to in pari delicto defense). While the foregoing cases are not
malpractice claims, they are relevant to the present Article because of the special
treatment for receivers in bringing claims that would otherwise be barred by in pari
delicto.
237
No. 3:08–CV1394–D, 2012 WL 2158733, at *26–27 (N.D. Tex. June 14, 2012).
“AmeriFirst” as used in this Article includes three separate AmeriFirst entities
referred to in the court’s opinion as the “AmeriFirst Clients.” Id. at *1.
238
Id.
239
Id. at *26.
240
Id. at *26–27.
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While a bankruptcy trustee or receiver is innocent, he or she
is not particularly special in this regard. The true plaintiffs in all
of these cases are businesses,241 all of which the lawyer should
understand as having an interest in avoiding legal liability.242
While some owner-agents of the business may have engaged in
misconduct, other stakeholders may not have. Those who have
not engaged in misconduct legitimately expect their investment
in the business to be protected by all of its agents—inside
managers and outside counsel alike.243 So even though the
business is appropriately held accountable to third parties for its
agents’ misconduct,244 it does not follow that the business should
be barred from pursuing claims against its agents—outside and
inside—who caused it to suffer that liability.245 At the end of the
day, a trustee or receiver exception does not address the
underlying problem: the mechanical application of agency
principles in legal malpractice cases deprives every business of
the ability to sue its outside counsel for malpractice.
E.

No Imputation Against Innocent Claimants

In the case NCP Litigation Trust v. KPMG LLP,246 the New
Jersey Supreme Court considered whether a litigation trust, as
successor to the corporation’s claims, could bring a malpractice
claim against an auditor who negligently failed to detect
company fraud.247 The fraud was related to the company’s
reported revenues and expenses; when the fraud was revealed,

241

See supra note 13–14 and accompanying text (describing who files suit on
behalf of the businesses in these cases).
242
Schaefer, Loyal Disclosure, supra note 79, at 423 (explaining that attorneys
should understand that organizational clients have an interest in avoiding legal
liability).
243
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (stating that
an agent has a duty to act with care, competence and diligence); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (defining
standard of care owed by attorney to client for purposes of a claim of professional
negligence or breach of fiduciary duty).
244
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 (describing principal’s liability for
tortious acts of agent).
245
See supra note 72 and accompanying text (explaining that the law has
always allowed inside agents to be sued in this context).
246
901 A.2d 871 (N.J. 2006).
247
The Trust alleged claims of “negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach
of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.” Id. at 876.
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the company was forced to declare bankruptcy.248 The court
decided that the trustee should be allowed to pursue the cause of
action, but that individuals who participated in or could have
prevented the fraud should not be able to enjoy a recovery.249
The court explained that imputing an agent’s conduct to a
principal makes sense in the context of protecting innocent third
parties, such as a party who negotiates a contract with the
company’s agent, but that the rationale for imputation breaks
down in the in pari delicto context.250 This is because imputing
the agent’s conduct to the principal results in absolving the
negligent auditor.251 On this basis, the court held that a party
who contributes to the misconduct—in this case, the auditor—
cannot invoke imputation, so a claim can be brought for damages
proximately caused by that party.252
Turning to the issue of whether the trust should be allowed
to bring the claim, the NCP court rejected the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s application of Illinois
law in the seminal Cenco case.253 The NCP court noted that
events in the twenty years since Cenco was decided indicate that
auditors need to be more alert to corporate fraud and courts must
take steps to address that fraud.254 The court explained Cenco’s
concern with compensating agents who had participated in the
fraud, but rejected the idea that the solution is to bar any
recovery.255 For this reason, the NCP court determined that only
innocent shareholders should have a recovery and that
imputation is appropriate to bar claims by shareholders who
participated in the fraud, those who should have been aware of

248

Id. at 873.
Id.
250
Id. at 879–80. The court does not actually use the phrase in pari delicto but
instead discusses imputation for purposes of determining if an auditor malpractice
claim should be dismissed.
251
Id. at 880. “Allowing KPMG to avoid liability for its allegedly negligent
conduct would not promote the purpose of the imputation doctrine—to protect the
innocent.” Id. at 882.
252
Id.
253
Id. at 885.
254
Id.
255
Id.
249
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the fraud because of their role in the company, and those who
own a large enough block of stock that they have the ability to
conduct oversight.256
The New York Court of Appeals recently rejected the NCP
approach.257 The New York court framed the issue as a dispute
between innocent stakeholders of the company and innocent
stakeholders of the outside professionals.258 The court reasoned
that the company’s agents were more culpable than the outside
professional’s agents in most cases, and concluded the company’s
innocent stakeholders should not prevail over the professional’s
innocent stakeholders.259
The New York Court of Appeals’ analysis overlooks the
critical fact that the outside professional was hired by the
company for the purpose of competently representing the
If that professional failed to act
company’s interests.260
competently and the company suffered damage as a result, the
company’s innocent owners can trace their injury to the conduct
of the professional. It follows that the negligent professional
should pay the client for the damage caused, and the innocent
owners should enjoy their proportionate share of that recovery.261
Even if the company’s inside agents were more culpable than the
outside professionals, that is not a justification for allowing the
professionals to avoid being held accountable to the company.262
As to why the innocent owners of a professional firm should
suffer a loss via the professional firm’s liability in this scenario,
256

Id. at 885–86.
Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 958–59 (N.Y. 2010).
258
Id. at 958 (“[W]hy should the interests of innocent stakeholders of corporate
fraudsters trump those of innocent stakeholders of the outside professionals who are
the defendants in these cases?”).
259
Id. (“[T]he corporation’s agents would almost invariably play the dominant
role in the fraud and therefore would be more culpable than the outside
professional’s agents who allegedly aided and abetted the insiders or did not detect
the fraud at all or soon enough.”).
260
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (describing an attorney’s duties to a client).
261
Id. § 48 (discussing that a lawyer has liability to a client for professional
negligence if the lawyer fails to exercise the competence and diligence normally
exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances and that failure is the legal cause of
the client’s injury).
262
Of course, fault could be apportioned between inside and outside
professionals in the company’s lawsuit against both groups. See infra notes 330–332
and accompanying text.
257
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this is when basic agency principles should come into play. The
professional firm is liable because its agent created liability for
the firm while acting within the scope of his or her professional
duties.263
The “innocent claimant” rule announced by the NCP court
does not address some concerns, however. First, the plaintiff
asserting a malpractice claim against a professional typically is
either the client or a third party standing in the shoes of the
client, such as a trustee or receiver, and not a third party who is
not in privity with the professional, such as a shareholder of the
client.264 While a shareholder may ultimately receive any
recovery by the client in a malpractice case, shareholders are not
the plaintiffs in these actions. Yet, the NCP court does not
explain how or why it would be appropriate to examine the
misconduct of such shareholders separately for purposes of
imputation.265 Second, the court holds that noninnocents entitled
to no recovery include “shareholders who engaged in the
fraud . . . those who, by way of their role in the company, should
have been aware of the fraud[, and those] . . . shareholders [who],
by virtue of their ownership of a large portion of stock, have the
ability to conduct oversight.”266 Even if it were possible to treat
different shareholders differently for purposes of recovery,267 it
would not be consistent with the law of attorney fiduciary duty to
prevent recovery to those shareholders who should have known
about the misconduct and those who should have been able to
conduct oversight because of their size.268 An attorney who—
263

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (describing
principal’s liability for tortious acts of agent).
264
See, e.g., In re MF Glob. Holdings Ltd. Inv. Litig., 611 F. App’x 34, 37–38 (2d
Cir. 2015) (finding that claims brought on behalf of audit client’s customers were
properly dismissed because auditor cannot be sued for professional negligence except
by client or someone with a relationship “so close as to approach that of privity”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 48 (describing that a
plaintiff in a professional negligence action is a person to whom a lawyer owes a
duty of care). The professional’s duty of care is owed to the client and not to owners
of the client. Id. §§ 50, 51 (describing lawyer’s duty of care to clients and a narrowly
defined list of nonclients, which would not include owners of a client).
265
NCP Litig. Tr. v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 885–86 (N.J. 2006).
266
Id. at 886.
267
The dissent questions how thousands of such determinations would be made
and calls the majority approach impracticable. Id. at 905 (Rivera-Soto, J.,
dissenting).
268
See supra notes 75–86 and 91–92.

2016]

IN PARI DELICTO DECONSTRUCTED

1049

even negligently—failed to protect the company against agent
misconduct should not be able to avoid paying those who should
have known of the misconduct. It is the company’s attorney
these owners should have been able to rely upon in this regard.269
IV. THE CASE FOR ALIGNING THE IN PARI DELICTO DOCTRINE
WITH ORGANIZATIONAL ATTORNEY FIDUCIARY DUTY
Following news of Enron and other high-profile corporate
scandals in 2001, commentators asked, “Where were the
lawyers?”270 Why didn’t lawyers stop fraudulent conduct by
insiders and protect these companies from financial ruin?271
Commentators rightly insisted the lawyers shared a measure of
the blame for these cases of misconduct and the subsequent
bankruptcies, but noted that lawyers were not held
accountable.272
Sixteen years after Enron, not much seems to have
changed.273 Other companies have faced substantial liability and

269

See supra notes 75–86 and 91–92.
Ashby Jones, Where Were the Lawyers?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 2, 2007, 8:52 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/01/02/where-were-the-lawyers (stating that implicit in
the question “[w]here were the lawyers?” in Enron era is the “assumption that
lawyers . . . could have done more to keep their companies out of hot water”); see also
Dan Ackman, Enron’s Lawyers: Eyes Wide Shut?, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2002, 12:16 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2002/01/28/0128veenron.html (asserting that Enron attorneys
Vinson & Elkins “asked few real questions, failed to talk to obvious key witnesses
and then blessed Enron’s treatment of controversial partnerships”).
271
Ackman, supra note 270.
272
Julie Hilden, Scummery Judgment: Why Enron’s Sleazy Lawyers Walked
While Their Accountants Fried, SLATE.COM (June 21, 2002, 10:45 AM), http://www.
slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2002/06/scummery_judgment.ht
ml (“[Y]ou would think Vinson & Elkins should be accountable because it was the
firm retained by Enron to investigate Sherron Watkins’ internal complaints. The law
firm’s investigation was inarguably a disaster for the company. But in the end,
Enron got what they paid for—and thus it seems Enron, not V & E, should be
faulted for the fact that the investigation did not go further than it did . . . .”).
273
Paul Lippe, Volkswagen: Where Were the Lawyers?, ABA J. (Oct. 13, 2015,
9:05 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/volkswagen_where_were_the_
lawyers (asserting that if Volkswagen’s lawyers had been “engaged enough” in the
business to know about the software the company had installed in eleven million
diesel cars to cheat emissions tests then they likely would have prevented it); Alice
Woolley, The Volkswagen Scandal: When We Ask “Where Were the Lawyers?” Do We
Ask the Wrong Question?, SLAW: COLUMN (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.slaw.ca/2015/
09/30/the-volkswagen-scandal-when-we-ask-where-were-the-lawyers-do-we-ask-thewrong-question (stating that the “where were the lawyers” question suggests that
lawyers can do better by preventing unlawful things from happening).
270
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have been destroyed by fraudulent schemes of company
insiders.274 But lawyers have largely escaped liability to the
clients they have harmed.275 The in pari delicto doctrine is the
reason.
Even when lawyers fail to fulfill their duties to
organizational clients, they are not held accountable because in
pari delicto provides a complete defense.276
This has broad implications for the legal profession. Basic
fiduciary duty principles dictate that an attorney should act as a
competent, loyal lawyer would to protect an organizational client
from agent misconduct that will result in liability—and often
bankruptcy—when discovered.277 Yet, the in pari delicto defense
has been a roadblock to a robust body of case law developing in
this area.278 Decisional law could explain the contours of a
lawyer’s fiduciary duty and help lawyers and law firms develop
best practices for addressing misconduct of an organizational
client’s agents.279
274
See Lippe, supra note 273 (regarding the Volkswagen emissions scandal and
likely legal liability for the company).
275
The Refco case provides an example. Joseph Collins engaged in criminal
misconduct with his client’s agents that ultimately bankrupted the client, yet the in
pari delicto doctrine provided a complete defense to his client’s legal malpractice
action against Collins and his law firm. Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 626 F.3d 673, 674,
677–78 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of malpractice claims against Mayer
Brown on the ground that the adverse-interest exception does not apply).
276
Id. at 678.
277
FDIC v. O’Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Part and
parcel of effectively protecting a client, and thus discharging the attorney’s duty of
care, is to protect the client from the liability which may flow from promulgating a
false or misleading offering to investors.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2), (3) (AM. LAW INST. 2000); see also supra notes 75–86
and accompanying text.
278
For example, the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers describes the
lawyer’s duty to act in the best interests of the organizational client in the face of
insider conduct that will create liability to or for the client, but the notes to that
section only cite a small number of cases that stand for that proposition.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2) cmt. f (citing six
cases that stand for the proposition that an attorney has a duty to protect the
organizational client against wrongful acts by constituents). Even though there is
such a duty, in pari delicto largely prevents such cases proceeding and resulting in
reported decisions.
279
Among other issues, such cases would reference expert testimony on the duty
of a reasonably prudent attorney addressing insider crime and fraud. See, e.g., FDIC
v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541, 1550–51 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting conflicting expert
testimony on whether attorneys breached duty to client bank by failing to “ferret
out” client’s agent’s fraud, that jury was properly instructed, and that adequate
proof supported jury verdict of lawyer negligence). The development of such case
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Without that body of case law or, more significantly, the
prospect of liability, lawyers are unlikely to take the fiduciary
duty to protect organizational clients seriously.280 Saying no to a
scheme to defraud third parties is difficult, as is up-the-ladder
reporting and loyal disclosure.281 Even though upholding these
obligations can protect an organizational client from liability,
lawyers risk losing a client by fulfilling these duties.282 If there is
no downside to lawyers turning a blind eye to, or even
facilitating, agent misconduct, then lawyers will be disinclined to
meet their legal obligations as fiduciaries.283
Deconstructing the pillars of the in pari delicto defense in
business attorney malpractice cases reveals a great irony. The
attorney’s defense depends upon principles that are inconsistent
with the attorney’s legal duty to the organizational client. To
fulfill a fiduciary duty to an organizational client whose agents
are engaged in fraudulent or criminal conduct, a lawyer is
required to disregard instructions of those agents and take
steps—including advising against misconduct and up-the-ladder
reporting—to protect the client from liability, without regard to

law, including law in cases in which the fraud was intended to enrich the
organizational client, would further the interests of the legal profession and
organizational clients.
280
Harris, supra note 20, at 638 (explaining that taking the entity theory of
organizational client seriously means recognizing that the lawyer has a duty to
prevent and/or limit the consequences of client crime or fraud); Hill & Painter, supra
note 103, at 43 (asserting that malpractice law theoretically discourages
incompetent legal advice—that is, advice that ignores the true meaning of the law
and ultimately contributes to a company’s bankruptcy—but that the in pari delicto
doctrine makes it difficult to pursue these claims); see also TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST
& HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD 136–51 (2006)
(describing the expectations of those who deal with fiduciaries and the adverse
consequences of treating lawyers and other professionals not as fiduciaries but as
businesses).
281
See, e.g., Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical
Obligation of Transactional Lawyers To Act as Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9,
38–42 (2003) (discussing the financial disincentive to lawyers acting in the best
interests of the organizational client).
282
Id.
283
Pritchard, supra note 88, at 192 (“The Cenco imputation rule invites
fiduciaries to neglect their duty to ferret out fraud by corporate insiders because
even if they are negligent, there will be no damages assessed against them for their
malfeasance. A rule that is not backed by a monetary sanction is likely to have a
very low rate of compliance.”).
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whether the conduct is profitable in the short run.284 Ironically, a
lawyer who negligently or intentionally ignores this obligation
can invoke the in pari delicto defense knowing that courts will:
(1) attribute an agent’s misconduct to the organizational client,
even where the lawyer took no steps, such as up-the-ladder
reporting, to protect the client,285 and (2) treat profitable illegal
conduct as being in the company’s interest.286 It makes no sense
that the very reasons the lawyer should face liability are the
reasons lawyers are given a complete defense to liability.287 And
though it would be logical to do so, courts act as if refusing
imputation in this context is akin to denying that gravity

284

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015)
(“When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions
ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is
doubtful. . . . Paragraph (b) makes clear, however, that when the lawyer knows that
the organization is likely to be substantially injured by action of an officer or other
constituent that violates a legal obligation to the organization or is in violation of
law that might be imputed to the organization, the lawyer must proceed as is
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization.”); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (stating
that if a lawyer knows that a constituent of an organization intends to act in a way
that violates an obligation to the organization or that will be imputed to the
organization and likely to result in substantial injury to it, then “the lawyer must
proceed in what the lawyer reasonably believes to be the best interests of the
organization”); id. § 96(3) (describing steps lawyer must take in the interest of the
client, including up-the-ladder reporting); id. § 96(3) cmt. d (explaining that an
agent’s instruction to the organization’s lawyer to perform, counsel, or assist in an
unlawful act does not bind the lawyer and “does not remove the lawyer’s duty to
protect the best interests of the organizational client”).
285
See supra notes 61–70 and accompanying text.
286
See supra notes 108–130 and accompanying text. For example, in Kirschner,
the court asserts that for the adverse-interest exception, we cannot find that the
exception applies based on the harm that flows from the discovery of the fraud. The
court asserts that “[i]f that harm could be taken into account, a corporation would be
able to invoke the adverse-interest exception and disclaim virtually every corporate
fraud—even a fraud undertaken for the corporation’s benefit—as soon as it was
discovered and no longer helping the company.” Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938
N.E.2d 941, 953 (N.Y. 2010). But this is not an outrageous proposition that the
company lawyer who is supposed to protect the organizational client from even
profitable illegal conduct should have liability for failing to do so. See supra note 284
and accompanying text.
287
A similar irony exists in the case of auditors’ protection from malpractice
liability. Shepard, supra note 100, at 326 (explaining that “it is only in those cases
where the very thing auditors are retained to help guard against—fraud—exists that
the in pari delicto defense has worked to immunize auditors from answering for
their own potential wrongdoing”).
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exists.288 Imputing agent conduct to a principal makes sense
when a third party is injured by the acts of an agent,289 but that
does not mean these same principles should be applied for
purposes of in pari delicto.
There are strong policy grounds for changing course from
current in pari delicto precedent. Policy matters in the in pari
delicto context. The United States Supreme Court has refused to
apply in pari delicto when doing so undermines a policy that
would be furthered by allowing a co-conspirator to bring a cause
of action.290 On this basis, the Court has found the doctrine
should not bar claims of co-conspirator plaintiffs in the areas of
securities law and antitrust law.291 Likewise, other courts should
refuse to apply the doctrine in this organizational attorney legal
malpractice context. Here, the important public policy is that
lawyers should have an incentive to act competently to protect
288

Stewart v. Wilmington Tr. SP Servs., Inc., 112 A.3d 271, 303 (Del. Ch. 2015)
(describing imputation in the in pari delicto context as harsh to the innocent
corporation, but “essential to the continued tolerance of the corporate form”);
Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 950–51 (explaining why agent conduct should be imputed
to principal and concluding that, “[i]n sum, we have held for over a century that all
corporate acts—including fraudulent ones—are subject to the presumption of
imputation”). But see AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009) (explaining that
whether an auditor should face malpractice liability in such cases is a “policy
judgment” and need not be answered by “some rote conflation of contextually
different questions of agency”).
289
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 6.01–6.03, 7.03–7.08 (AM. LAW
INST. 2006); see also id. ch. 2, intro. note (“This Chapter states . . . the three distinct
bases on which the common law of agency attributes the legal consequences of one
person’s action to another person. . . . The three distinct bases for attribution are
actual authority, apparent authority, and respondeat superior. . . . The legal
consequences that these doctrines attribute to a principal are not consequences of
agency doctrine itself but of other bodies of law.”). Even the Kirschner court, which
was rigid in its insistence upon relying upon imputation in the in pari delicto
context, appears to recognize that advocates for a different rule are not suggesting
that agency principles be jettisoned in this context. See Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 954
(“No one disputes that traditional imputation principles . . . should remain
unchanged—indeed, are essential—in other contexts.”); see also sources cited supra
note 288.
290
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 311 (1985)
(determining that in pari delicto should bar a co-conspirator’s private securities
fraud cause of action only if preclusion would not significantly interfere with the
policy underlying federal securities laws and the co-conspirator bears at least
substantially equal responsibility for the violation).
291
Id. at 315 (determining that denying in pari delicto defense was appropriate
to advance policy of protecting the investing public that underlies securities fraud
law).
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their organizational clients against the liability that flows from
agents engaging in misconduct.292 Only if the “co-conspirator”—
that is, the company or its successor in interest—is allowed to
bring this cause of action will that policy be advanced.293 While
courts have traditionally asserted that applying in pari delicto
deters misconduct, that is not the case in this context. In fact,
the opposite is true: allowing these legal malpractice cases to
proceed would give lawyers an incentive to say no to the schemes
of their clients’ agents.294 Further, reaching the merits of these
cases will not amount to courts mediating disputes between
wrongdoers.295 Instead, it will bolster the reputation of the courts
if they hold lawyers accountable for their roles in corporate client
crime and fraud.296
The problem is more complicated than courts mistakenly
relying on agency principles in these cases or being too rigid in
following in pari delicto precedent. The decisions denying
organizational clients a legal malpractice action reflect
skepticism that lawyers are responsible for the damages suffered

292
A related benefit would be discouraging corporate crime and fraud. But the
focus of the malpractice action itself is preventing harm to the corporate client that
the lawyer was hired to serve competently.
293
In the securities fraud context of the Supreme Court’s Bateman decision,
there are other possible avenues of enforcing securities fraud laws other than
allowing those who participated in the misconduct to proceed as plaintiffs.
Nonetheless, the Court determined that securities fraud policy was advanced by
allowing plaintiffs who had traded on inside information to bring a securities fraud
claim. Bateman, 472 U.S. at 315 (discussing the SEC’s limited resources in detecting
and pursuing claims of such fraud and concluding that allowing co-conspirator
security fraud claims promotes the policy underlying securities fraud law). In
contrast, in this context, only a so-called co-conspirator organizational client could
bring a cause of action for legal malpractice against an attorney who did not act
competently to protect it from legal liability. In other words, the public policy of
attorneys acting competently to protect organizational clients from liability is
furthered only if this cause of action is allowed, providing even stronger grounds
than in Bateman for allowing such cases to proceed.
294
See supra notes 185–193 and accompanying text. Cf. Shepard, supra note
100, at 337 (asserting that current application of the in pari delicto defense to
auditors “as it relates to the very thing they were hired to help monitor eliminates a
large incentive to do a good job”).
295
See supra notes 152–168 and accompanying text.
296
Some may conclude that courts’ refusal to hold lawyers accountable is
evidence of the bias judges, as lawyers themselves, have in favor of lawyers.
BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
2–3 (2013).
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by clients in these cases.297 For example, in Kirschner, the New
York Court of Appeals asserts that a company suing its outside
professionals for malpractice is akin to an injured robber suing
the police or the singed arsonist suing the fire department.298
But these are not fair comparisons.299 Unlike the robber or the
arsonist, the organizational client hired the lawyer for the
purpose of competently representing its interests.300 Even if
some of the organization’s agents believe it is in the company’s
interests to push the limits of the law, the lawyer knows—and is
required to assure the insiders understand—that it is in the
company’s interest to avoid criminal and fraudulent conduct.301
297

Cf. supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. The Kirschner court relies on the
Cenco court’s statement that fraud on behalf of a corporation is different than fraud
for it. Kirschner v. KPMG LLP 938 N.E.2d 941, 952–53 (N.Y. 2010) (citing Cenco
Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982)). But an attorney is
not allowed to view the world that way. An attorney is required to disregard the
instructions of agents that want to commit fraud against it and for it. It is
unsurprising that a court that takes this view would not impose liability on a lawyer
who failed to protect an organizational client from liability stemming from fraud
intended to enrich the client. Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 959. It is also predictable that
lawyers share the view that they should not be liable for this failure. See, e.g., Kelli
M. Hinson et al., Professional Liability, 66 SMU L. REV. 1055, 1059–60 (2013)
(describing a case in which a court refused to grant summary judgment in favor of
lawyers on the basis of in pari delicto as “a cautionary tale of how courts sometimes
step in and hold lawyers accountable when clients go bad”); Craig D. Singer, When
the Client Is a Fraud: Defending Professionals and Firms Following a Client’s
Misconduct, 42 LITIG. J. 35, 38 (2015) (“[A] corporation charged with primary
responsibility for fraud should not be permitted to recover against another party—
the professional defendant—for damages caused by the professional’s failure to stop
the corporation’s own fraud.”).
298
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
299
Another common description of the scenario is a client attempting to hold the
lawyer accountable for failing to “ferret out” the client’s fraud. This presumes that
the lawyer never plays an active role in the misconduct in these cases, which of
course, is contradicted by the facts of these cases. See, e.g., supra note 28 and
accompanying text (describing the active, criminal role Joseph Collins played in the
Refco fraud that bankrupted the company). Further, even if the lawyer was only
negligent in not detecting agents’ fraudulent scheme, such negligence still violates a
duty the lawyer was arguably hired to perform. Determining the appropriateness of
recovery are more appropriately determined by a fact finder considering issues of
duty and causation than by a judge dismissing on the basis of in pari delicto.
300
See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16
(AM. LAW INST. 2000) (listing duties to clients); id. § 94 (stating that a lawyer can
have liability to a client for advising the client to violate duties to third parties when
doing so violates the duty of care to the client).
301
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2) (stating
that a lawyer must act in the best interests of the client which is defined as
protecting it from agent conduct that will “violate[] a legal obligation to the
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Unlike the company’s inside agents who are not experts in law,
the company’s lawyer is obligated to advise about the risks of
such liability, to advise against such conduct again and again
through increasingly higher authorities if necessary and perhaps
even outside of the company, and to refuse to participate in such
behavior.302
When competent lawyers take these steps,
companies can avoid substantial liability and their destruction.
When a lawyer fails to act competently in this regard, either by
negligence or through intentional participation in insider
misconduct, the lawyer should be accountable to the company
whose legal interests a competent lawyer would have
protected.303
Once courts recognize a lawyer’s legal obligation to an
organizational client, they should be willing to align the
application of the in pari delicto doctrine with attorney fiduciary
duty. Such an alignment would be accomplished with the
following formulation: agent conduct will not be imputed to the
organizational client for purposes of in pari delicto when an
organizational client304 alleges that its lawyer failed to act
competently305 to protect the organization against committing a
organization” or that is “imputable to the organization and likely to result in
substantial injury to it”); FDIC v. O’Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir.
1992) (asserting that the presence of client fraud does not cancel the attorney’s duty
of care); see also Schaefer, Loyal Disclosure, supra note 79, at 423 (explaining that
attorneys are obligated to treat organizational clients as having an interest in
avoiding legal liability).
302
See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text. With no realistic threat of
legal malpractice liability, there is little incentive for lawyers to wrestle with
whether they are competently advising their corporate clients about the serious
liability consequences of contemplated transactions. See Hill & Painter, supra note
103, at 46 (describing situations in which lawyers advise and facilitate
organizational client misconduct—and liability—because the lawyers focus on
technical compliance with particular laws and loopholes).
303
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 48, 49 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (discussing a lawyer’s liability to the client for professional negligence or
breach of fiduciary duty that is the legal cause of client injury); see also Harris,
supra note 20, at 658 (“[I]f one sees the proper role of a transactional lawyer for an
organization as including vigilance for the proper, legal conduct of the organization’s
business within the scope of her engagement, it is natural that the lawyer should be
liable when failure to reasonably fulfill that role results in harm to her client.”).
304
This rule would also apply to a successor in interest to an organizational
client.
305
An allegation that an attorney did not act competently is generally described
as a cause of action for professional negligence or malpractice. RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 48 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (discussing failure to exercise

2016]

IN PARI DELICTO DECONSTRUCTED

1057

crime or fraud,306 and that failure was the legal cause of the
client’s injury, such as liability or bankruptcy.307
This
formulation effectively aligns both bodies of law by not imputing
agent conduct to organizational client under circumstances when
the attorney would not be allowed to do so.308 Ultimately, this
formulation allows plaintiffs the opportunity to present their case
that a reasonably competent attorney would have protected the
organizational client, irrespective of any explicit undertaking to
do so.
Professor Kevin Michels has suggested a “gatekeeperimputation exception” that would provide for no imputation of
agent conduct to the corporate client in a legal malpractice case if
(1) the lawyer agreed to undertake an investigation or
monitoring role; or (2) if there is an implied obligation to
investigate and monitor that can be “derived from certain ethics
rules, such as RPC 1.13 or . . . RPC 2.1, and statutory provisions
(such as the Sarbanes Oxley reporting requirements) which
require the attorney to undertake specific investigation or
reporting efforts in carefully delimited instances.”309 Professor
Michels asserts, “[I]t seems that something more than the duty of
care alone should be required to imply [an investigating and
monitoring] duty” and that “ethics rules that are roughly
analogous to the duty of care that attaches to all representations,
such as the duty of competence and communication requirements
of RPC 1.1 and RPC 1.4, respectively, should not, standing alone,
trigger the gatekeeper imputation exception.”310 In contrast, the
formulation suggested in this Article is based on the
understanding that a lawyer’s fiduciary duties of care and loyalty

care which is defined as the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers
under the circumstances). The allegation could also or alternatively be that the
attorney breached fiduciary duty or contractual obligations to the organizational
client in failing to protect it from liability. Id. §§ 49, 55(1); see also supra note 6
(explaining ways that the cause of action could be framed).
306
Such failures could include failing to report misconduct up-the-ladder, failing
to advise against illegal conduct, and even intentionally participating in such
conduct. See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text.
307
Causation and damages are elements of a claim for professional negligence
and breach of fiduciary duty. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 53 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
308
See supra notes 284–286 and accompanying text.
309
Michels, supra note 92, at 363–64.
310
Id.
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impose an obligation to protect an organizational client from
liability at the hands of agents.311 Professional conduct rules are
not the original source of a duty to act competently and loyally to
protect the organizational client from liability. Rather, the
professional conduct rules are reflective of fiduciary duties owed
to an organizational client.312 The formulation suggested in the
present Article would provide plaintiffs the opportunity to
present, through expert testimony, evidence that a reasonably
prudent, loyal lawyer would have taken steps to protect the
organizational client under the circumstances presented in a
given case, irrespective of a specific undertaking to do so and
regardless of whether a specific professional conduct rule
addresses the issue.313
As a result of the change in the law of imputation suggested
in this Article, the in pari delicto doctrine could not be invoked by
lawyers to seek dismissal, judgment on the pleadings, or
summary judgment on the basis that company agents were
participants in misconduct.314 In most situations, these cases
would proceed to trial and an attorney would defend by
presenting evidence that the attorney did not breach duties to
the organizational client or that any such breach did not cause
damages to the client.315 Just as in any other malpractice case,
the client—or successor—and lawyer would rely upon expert
testimony regarding what a reasonably prudent lawyer should

311
See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text. But see supra note 278 and
accompanying text (acknowledging that little case law explains this obligation
because the in pari delicto defense has barred pursuit of claims for breaching the
duty).
312
See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text; see also Simon, supra note 80,
at 503 (asserting that fiduciary duty owed to the organizational client is even
broader than that described in Model Rule 1.13(b), but that the rule is sometimes
mistakenly interpreted as stating the full extent of the lawyer’s obligation in the face
of agent misconduct).
313
See infra note 316 and accompanying text.
314
As a matter of civil procedure, prior to trial, courts must accept the truth of
the allegations of a complaint. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), 12(c), 56. Under the proposed
change in the law, proof satisfactory to the finder of fact would be the only route to a
defense victory based on imputation. See infra notes 327–329 and accompanying
text, for scenarios in which such proof could be established.
315
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 48, 49 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (describing elements of proof for claims of professional negligence and
breach of fiduciary duty).
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have done under the circumstances.316 Taking away in pari
delicto does not guarantee a finding of malpractice under these
facts, but simply provides the opportunity for the client or its
successor to prove its case.317
This doctrinal approach—of not presumptively imputing
agent conduct to principal for purposes of in pari delicto in such
cases—is preferable to other efforts to limit the breadth of the
defense. Expansion of the adverse-interest exception318 and
creation of a bad faith exception319 do not get to the heart of the
issue: it is not appropriate or fair to impute agent conduct to the
principal if it was the attorney’s obligation to protect the
principal from that agent.320 While the innocent decision-maker
exception could ultimately accomplish the same goal as refusing
imputation,321 it is unnecessarily complicated in that the default
rule would still be imputation,322 and would be subject to doubt
because of its origin of arising out of a misunderstanding of the

316

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52, cmt. g
(alleging professional negligence or breach of fiduciary duty ordinarily introduces
expert testimony on the standard of care); see, e.g., FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541,
1550–51 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting conflicting expert testimony on the issue of whether
attorneys had breached duty of care to bank client in how attorneys handled client’s
agent’s fraud and determining adequate evidence supported jury’s verdict against
attorneys). This is an example of how the law of attorney fiduciary duty can address
new problems in the representation of entity clients by referring to core values of
competence and loyalty. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law in the Twenty-First
Century, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1289, 1290 (2011) (“Fiduciary law can accommodate new
situations . . . yet maintain its core values and norms.”).
317
Thus, it is not the all-or-nothing proposition posed by some commentators.
See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 88, at 198–99 (asserting that shareholders may
prefer the Cenco imputation rule, which would bar a professional negligence cause of
action, because “putting professionals on the hook for negligently failing to
uncover . . . ‘fraud’ ” would cause attorneys to refuse representations now that the
boundaries of fraud have become murkier). But the issue is not whether lawyers
should always or never have liability when they fail to protect against client fraud.
The question is whether liability should be a possibility or should always be
prohibited based on imputation. Allowing the possibility of liability seems a more
sensible solution if we want lawyers to fulfill their fiduciary duties to organizational
clients.
318
See supra Section IV.A.
319
See supra Section IV.B.
320
See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
321
See supra Section IV.C.
322
See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
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law.323 In all of these cases, chipping away at imputation
through exceptions is not as sensible as refusing imputation on a
principled basis in the first instance.
Further, allowing only so-called innocents, namely
bankruptcy trustees or receivers,324 or the innocent ultimate
claimants to any recovery,325 to pursue claims without the bar of
in pari delicto disregards the fact that the organization itself is
an innocent in this context. The organizational client has an
interest in avoiding liability at the hands of its agents and hires
a lawyer to further this interest.326 If fiduciary duty law is to
effectively impose this conception of organizational clients upon
lawyers, it is essential that organizational clients be allowed to
pursue these claims.
The question remains whether there is a possible factual
scenario in which agent knowledge or conduct should be imputed
to the organizational client for purposes of in pari delicto. For
example, if the facts reveal that company’s lawyer took concerns
of liability-creating conduct up-the-ladder to the highest
authority in the company but those individuals still insisted upon
engaging in the misconduct with counsel’s assistance,327 should
the lawyer be allowed to invoke in pari delicto? The answer
should turn on whether the entity has innocent stakeholders. As
long as someone with a stake in the company has an interest in
the company avoiding legal liability, then the company’s lawyer
should not be allowed to escape liability through imputation of
agent knowledge to the entity.328 In contrast, if the solvent
323

See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
See supra Section IV.D.
325
See supra Section IV.E.
326
See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
327
In this scenario, the lawyer has arguably violated the standard of care by
participating in client misconduct, but has informed the company’s highest authority
of the potential for liability, thus providing the basis for an argument that the client
had knowledge of and participated in the misconduct. Cf. supra notes 91–92 and
accompanying text (arguing that it is unfair to impute agent conduct to principal
when lawyer did not fulfill duty of up-the-ladder reporting).
328
See supra note 88 and accompanying text (explaining the significance of
innocent stakeholders); see also Harris, supra note 20, at 643 (summarizing duties of
lawyer who becomes aware of agent crime or fraud for solvent and insolvent
organizations); id. at 646 (asserting that agent conduct should not be imputed to
organizational client to bar a cause of action against attorney in the case of a solvent
organization unless either “wrongdoing representatives were 100 percent owners of
the organization,” or the lawyer disclosed information about the wrongdoing to all
324
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company is truly the “evil zombie” or alter ego of fully informed
agent-owners, imputation for purposes of in pari delicto is
arguably appropriate.329
Abandoning imputation in most cases—and the resulting
loss of the in pari delicto defense—does not mean that the
lawyers must bear the full responsibility for organizational client
misconduct.330 Organizations and their successors already have
the ability to pursue claims against the insiders who played a
role in the misconduct.331 Whether these insiders are sued in
separate cases or as part of the same case, fact finders should be
asked to assess the damages each agent caused to the company
and hold the lawyer accountable only for his or her share.332
CONCLUSION
Sometime soon, another corporate scandal will break and the
public will ask, “Where were the lawyers?” The honest answer to
that question should embarrass the legal profession. Lawyers

affected stakeholders who agreed further disclosure was unnecessary, while in the
case of in insolvent organization, imputation would only be appropriate if the lawyer
disclosed the misconduct “to affected parties outside of the organization”).
329
Freeman v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 865 So. 2d 543, 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2003) (“In this case, NorthAmerican was controlled exclusively by persons
engaging in its fraudulent scheme and benefitting from it. NorthAmerican was not a
large corporation with an honest board of directors and multiple shareholders,
suffering from the criminal acts of a few rogue employees in a regional office. It is
clear from the allegations of the amended complaint that it was created by the
Grazianos to dupe the customers. This corporation was entirely the robot or the evil
zombie of the corporate insiders.”).
330
This has been a frequent argument against abandoning in pari delicto. See,
e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 957 (N.Y. 2010) (“This case reduces
down to whether, and under what circumstances, we choose to reinterpret New York
common law to permit corporations to shift responsibility for their own agents’
misconduct to third parties.”).
331
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
332
There is some appeal to framing the issue as one that can be resolved
through the law of comparative fault applicable in the vast majority of U.S.
jurisdictions. Johnson, Unlawful Conduct, supra note 104, at 78–79 (asserting that
unlawful conduct defenses, including in pari delicto, are inconsistent with “the
strongest trend in modern American tort law” of comparing fault rather than
focusing solely on the plaintiff’s fault as in former contributory fault systems).
However, there is dissonance in imputing the insiders’ conduct to the client for
purposes of comparative fault but not for purposes of in pari delicto. Even without
asking a jury to compare fault of the “organizational client” and lawyer, it seems
workable for a jury to award to the client only the damages proximately caused by
the lawyer’s breach and not by the breach of any other agent.
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are fiduciaries who owe their clients duties of competence and
loyalty. If lawyers would uphold these duties, many business
scandals could be prevented. But there is no real incentive for
lawyers to get it right. The reason is the in pari delicto doctrine.
The in pari delicto defense depends on a great irony. The
facts that should trigger liability for the lawyer—that the lawyer
did not act reasonably to stop insider misconduct aimed at
enriching the entity client—are the basis for the lawyer’s
defense. This is because the in pari delicto doctrine imputes
agent conduct to the principal in the very circumstance when a
competent, loyal lawyer is supposed to stop listening to company
agents. In short, the lawyer’s failure becomes his salvation. The
client cannot sue the lawyer because the lawyer did not do his
job.
The law of in pari delicto should be aligned with attorney
fiduciary duty. Doing so would mean that in most cases, agent
misconduct would not be imputed to the organizational client.
This change would result in the business client or its successor
having a fair opportunity to pursue a claim against its lawyer for
legal malpractice. This would further the interests of business
clients and the legal profession. When attorneys know their
fiduciary duty is not just theoretical but a possible basis of
liability, they will have an incentive to protect their business
clients from misguided agent conduct.

